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ABSTRACT
We analyze the reliability of voluntary disclosures of nancial information, focusing on widely-
employed publicly available hedge fund databases. Tracking changes to statements of historical
performance recorded at di¤erent points in time between 2007 and 2011, we nd that historical
returns are routinely revised. These revisions are not merely random or corrections of earlier
mistakes; they are partly forecastable by fund characteristics. Moreover, funds that revise their
performance histories signicantly and predictably underperform those that have never revised,
suggesting that unreliable disclosures constitute a valuable source of information for current and
potential investors. These results speak to current debates about mandatory disclosures by nancial
institutions to market regulators.
I. Introduction
In January 2011 the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed a rule requiring U.S.-based
hedge funds to provide regular reports on their performance, trading positions, and counterparties
to a new nancial stability panel established under the Dodd-Frank Act. A modied version of
this proposal was voted for adoption in October 2011, and was phased in starting late 2012. The
proposal requires detailed quarterly reports (using new Form PF) for 200 or so large hedge funds,
those managing over U.S.$1.5 billion, which collectively account for over 80% of total hedge fund
assets under management; for smaller hedge funds, these reports will be less detailed, and required
only annually. The proposal states clearly that the reports would only be available to the regulator,
with no provisions in the proposal regarding reporting to fundsinvestors. Nevertheless, hedge funds
argued against the proposal, citing concerns that the government regulator responsible for collecting
the reports could not guarantee that their contents would not eventually be made public.1
The economic theory literature almost uniformly predicts that providing more information
to consumers is welfare enhancing (an early example is Stigler (1961), also see Jin and Leslie
(2003, 2009) and references therein). Hedge funds, however, are notoriously protective of their
proprietary trading models and positions, and generally disclose only limited information, even to
their own investors. One important piece of information that many hedge funds do o¤er to a wider
audience is their monthly investment performance. This information (as well as information on
fund characteristics and assets under management),2 is self-reported by thousands of individual
hedge funds to one or more publicly available databases. Under the 3(c)1 and 3(c)7 exemptions
to the Investment Company Act, disclosing past performance and fund size to publicly available
databases is thought to be one of the few channels that hedge funds can use to market themselves
to potential new investors (see Jorion and Schwarz (2010) for example). As a result, these databases
are widely used by researchers, current and prospective investors, and the media.
In this paper we closely examine hedge fund disclosures to these publicly available databases,
with the goal of providing empirical evidence to underpin the current debate on hedge fund dis-
closure regulation. We are particularly interested in whether these voluntary disclosures by hedge
funds are reliable guides to their past performance, and we attempt to answer this question by
tracking changes to statements of performance in these databases recorded at di¤erent points in
1See SEC press releases 2011-23 and 2011-226, available at www.sec.gov/news/press.shtml. For response from the
hedge fund industry, see Hedge Funds Gird to Fight Proposals on Disclosure, Wall Street Journal, February 3 2011.
2Note that the information provided does not include the holdings or trading strategies of the fund.
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time between 2007 and 2011. In each vintage of these databases,3 hedge funds provide infor-
mation on their performance from the time they began reporting to the database until the most
recent period. We nd evidence that in successive vintages of these databases, older performance
records (pertaining to periods as far back as fteen years) of hedge funds are routinely revised. This
behavior is widespread: 49% of the 12,128 hedge funds in our sample have revised their previous
returns by at least 0.01% at least once, nearly 30% of funds have revised a previous monthly return
by at least 0.5%, and over 20% by at least 1%. These are very substantial changes, comparable to,
or exceeding, the average monthly return in our sample period of 0.62%.
While positive revisions are also commonplace, negative revisions are more common and larger
when they occur, i.e., on average, initially provided returns present a more rosy picture of hedge
fund performance than nally revised performance. This suggests the danger of prospective in-
vestors being wooed into making decisions based on initially reported histories which are then
subsequently revised. Moreover, these revisions are not random, indeed, we employ information on
the characteristics and past performance of hedge funds to predict them. For example, Funds-of-
Funds and hedge funds in the Emerging Markets style are signicantly more likely to have revised
their histories of returns than Managed Futures funds. Larger funds, more volatile funds, and less
liquid funds are also more likely to revise.
Several of the characteristics of revising funds are suggestive of underlying incentives to engage in
revising behavior. For example, a fund experiencing a change of management company or manager
is 10% more likely to revise its past returns, holding all else constant. Following such events, we
hypothesize that new management might potentially be interested in a fresh start,revamping the
accounting, marking-to-market, auditing, and compliance practices of their newly acquired funds,
thus resulting in a sequence of revisions to past returns.4 Another important characteristic that is
associated with revising behavior is the presence of a high-water mark in the fund. Managers have
greater incentives to revise past returns downwards (or simply to correct previous valuation errors
only in the positive direction) when they are well below their high-water marks, so as to reset the
level at which they begin earning performance fees. Consistent with this explanation, we nd that
funds with a high-water mark are 13% more likely to revise than those without a high-water mark.
Moreover, when funds with a high-water mark revise returns, their average return revision is  62
3This has links with the real time dataliterature in macroeconomics, see Croushore (2011) for a recent survey.
4While this may be well-intentioned, any such changes to pre-existing practices may also indicate the presence of
poor pre-existing operational controls within the fund.
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basis points. In contrast, funds without a high-water mark provision, have average return revisions
of +40 basis points. This allows for a renement of our nding that the unconditional average
return revision is negative: funds with an incentive to revise returns below high-water marks revise
downwards on average, whereas funds without high-water marks revise returns upwards, making
past returns appear higher in subsequent revisions.
To provide a concrete example of the sort of revising behavior to which we refer, consider the
(anonymized but true) case of Hedge Fund X, which was incorporated in the early 1990s. Four
months later the fund began reporting to a database, and a year after inception it reported assets
under management (AUM) in the top quintile of all funds. In the mid 2000s, the fund experienced
a troubled quarter and saw its AUM halve in value. It then ceased reporting AUM gures. The
funds performance recovered, and during the last quarter of 2008 it reported a particularly good
double digit return, putting it in the top decile of funds. However a few months later this high
return was revised downward signicantly, into a large negative return. A similar pattern emerged
later that year, when a previously reported high month return was substantially adjusted downward
in a later vintage, along with two other past returns altered. A further sequence of poor returns
was then revealed, and the fund was nally reported as closed in mid 2009.
The example provided above suggests that these revisions should be interpreted as negative
signals by investors, that is, they are manifestations of the asymmetric information problem em-
bedded in voluntary disclosures of nancial information. However, it is possible that revisions are
innocuous despite being systematically associated with particular fund characteristics. For exam-
ple, they may simply be corrections of earlier mistakes, and therefore contain no information about
future fund performance. Such corrections would have to be substantive, as we nd that simple
errors such as digit transpositions and decimal point errors make up only a negligible fraction of
the revisions observed in our sample.
To better understand the information content of revisions, at each vintage of data we categorize
hedge funds into those that have revised their return histories at least once (revisers) and the
remainder (non-revisers). We nd that, on average, revising funds signicantly underperform non-
revising funds, and that there is a far greater risk of experiencing a large negative return when
investing in a revising fund. Moreover, we nd that revisers are signicantly more likely to cease
reporting to a database, a signal that is correlated with liquidation. In short, this analysis reveals
in real time that funds with unreliable reported returns are likely to underperform in the future.
This nding is virtually unchanged by risk-adjustment using various models, not greatly a¤ected
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by varying the size threshold for detecting signicant revisions, stronger for revisions pertaining
to periods far back in time, stronger for funds with higher levels of asset illiquidity, and robust to
various other changes in parameter values. The results from these robustness checks also provide
some evidence that performance di¤erentials between revisers and non-revisers are higher for more
illiquid funds, but they are by no means restricted to these funds.
Our analysis suggests that mandatory, audited disclosures by hedge funds, such as those pro-
posed by the SEC in 2011, could be benecial to investors and not just regulators, and contributes
to a growing list of examples highlighting the benets of an independent auditor or regulator for
nancial institutions. For example, Daníelsson, et al. (2001) note that under Basel II European
banks were given the choice of either using a standardized model to measure their risk exposures
(used in setting their capital requirements), or using their own in-house models. These in-house
models were subject to audit by the banking regulator, but due to the complexity of each banks
models it is questionable whether it was possible or feasible for the regulator to properly monitor
their e¤ectiveness. After the nancial crisis, it was noted in the press and in the nance literature
that these models appear to have under-estimated the true risk of many bankspositions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we review related literature.
In Section III, we describe the data and introduce how we determine revisions. Section IV outlines
our methodology. We present our main empirical results in Section V and robustness checks in
Section VI. Section VII concludes. An internet appendix contains additional analyses.
II. Related literature
Several previous authors have noted problems with self-reported hedge fund returns. The fact that
hedge fund managers voluntarily disclose returns to hedge fund databases means that they are able
to choose if and when to start reporting, and when to stop reporting. This leads to substantial biases
not seen in traditional data sets, such as listed equities or registered mutual funds. Ackermann,
McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Fung and Hsieh (2009) and Liang (2000)
provide an overview of these biases such as survivorship, self-selection and backll.
Self-reporting also leads to the possibility of using di¤erent models to value assets, as well as
the possibility of earnings smoothing. For example, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) document
high serial correlation in reported hedge fund returns relative to other nancial asset returns, and
consider various reasons such as underlying asset illiquidity to explain this. Asness, Krail, and Liew
(2001) note that the presence of serial correlation leads reported returns to appear less risky and
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less correlated with other assets than they truly are, thus providing an incentive for hedge fund
managers to intentionally smooth their reported returns, a form of earnings management for
the hedge fund industry. Cassar and Gerakos (2011) match due diligence reports with smoothing
measures, and nd that smoother returns are associated with managers who have greater discretion
in sourcing the prices used to value the funds investment positions. Bollen and Pool (2008) extend
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) to consider autocorrelation patterns that change with the
sign of the return on the fund, with the hypothesis being that hedge fund managers have a greater
incentive to smooth losses than gains, and they nd evidence of this in their analysis. This nding
is reinforced using a di¤erent approach in Bollen and Pool (2009), who document that there are
substantially fewer reported monthly returns that are small and negative than one might expect.
When aggregating to bimonthly returns no such problem arises, suggesting that the relative lack of
small negative returns in the data is caused by temporarily overstated returns. Jylha (2011) extends
Bollen and Pool (2009)s work on misreporting by conditioning the search for pooled distribution
discontinuities on various fund attributes. In a recent study, Bollen and Pool (2012) propose a
variety of agsfor potential fraudulent activity based just on reported returns, and link these to
an indicator for whether the fund has been charged with legal or regulatory violations.
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) nd evidence that hedge funds tend to underreport returns
during the calendar year, leading to a spike in reported returns in December that cannot be ex-
plained using risk-based factors (a similar result for quarter-end returns for mutual funds can be
found in Carhart et al. (2002)). The motivation for doing so is that hedge funds are paid incentive
fees once a year based on annual performance. At higher frequencies, Patton and Ramadorai (2013)
nd that estimated hedge fund risk exposures appear to be highest at the beginning of the month,
and lowest just prior to end of month reporting periods.
Others have looked at 13-F lings by hedge funds to uncover evidence of unreliable voluntary
disclosure, such as Cici, Kempf, and Puetz (2011) who nd evidence that these lings often appear
to be valued at prices di¤erent from prevailing closing prices in CRSP, Ben-David et al. (2011)
who present evidence that hedge funds appear to increase holdings of illiquid stocks at critical
reporting valuation dates, and Agarwal et al. (2011) who nd that hedge funds are the greatest
users of condentiality provisions to delay reporting of sensitive positions in 13-F lings.5 While
5Along the same lines, Aragon and Nanda (2011) examine the timing issues surrounding short-run history man-
agement. While they do not examine return revisions, they nd that the reporting of bad news by hedge funds is
strategically delayed until weak performance reverses.
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our paper is related to this stream of research, the new empirical phenomenon we document might
be better labeled history managementwith closer parallels to earnings restatements rather than
to earnings management (see Dechow et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the accounting
literature on the subject).
The literature on hedge funds has also considered the role of mandatory disclosures for hedge
funds. For a unique, and brief, period in 2006 before the rule was vacated, the SEC required hedge
funds to disclose a variety of information such as potential conicts of interest, and past legal
and regulatory problems. These Form ADV disclosures were designed to deter fraud, or control
operational risk more generally. Brown et al. (2008, 2012) report evidence that these mandatory
disclosures of information related to operational risk were benecial to investors. The authors nd
that the information in these disclosures enabled investors to select managers that went on to have
better performance, and that conicts identied in the Form ADV lings were correlated with other
ags for operational risks.
Our analysis of changes in the reported histories of hedge fund returns is also related to
Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009), who study changes in the I/B/E/S database of analysts
stock recommendations. These authors document that up to 20% of matched observations are
altered from one database to the next, using annual vintages of the IBES database from 2001-2007.
Like us, they nd that these revisions are not random: recommendations that were further from
the consensus, or from all staranalysts, were more likely to be revised than others, and undoing
these changes reduces the persistence in the performance of analyst recommendations. While the
focus of these authors was primarily to illuminate problems of replicability in academic research,
our concerns run deeper on account of the environment of limited disclosure for hedge funds. This
environment generates a greater reliance on self-reported hedge fund data. We demonstrate that
hedge fund return revisions could skew allocations by investors reliant on the initial return pre-
sented. Moreover, the signicantly lower future returns and greater downside risks in troubled times
experienced by funds with unreliable disclosures suggests that the issue that we identify represents
a source of risk to hedge fund investors, and quite possibly a broader systemic risk.
Finally, it is worth noting here that information on the trading strategies and positions of hedge
funds also has implications for how they are compensated. Foster and Young (2010) show theoreti-
cally the di¢ culty of devising a performance-based compensation contract for hedge fund managers
that rewards skilled managers but not unskilled managers. With only returns histories made avail-
able for performance evaluation, unskilled managers can mimic skilled managers arbitrarily well
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simply by taking on an investment with a small probability of a large crash. Foster and Young
(2010) argue that transparency of positions, not just performance, is needed to separate skilled
managers from unskilled managers.
III. Data
III.A. Consolidated hedge fund and fund-of-fund data
We employ a large cross-section of hedge funds and funds-of-funds over the period from January
1994 to May 2011, which is consolidated from data in the TASS, HFR, CISDM, Morningstar, and
BarclayHedge databases. Appendix A contains details of the process followed to consolidate these
data. The funds in the combined database come from a broad range of vendor-classied strategies,
which are consolidated into ten main strategy groups: Security Selection, Macro, Relative Value,
Directional Traders, Funds-of-Funds, Multi-Process, Emerging Markets, Fixed Income, Managed
Futures, and Other (a catch-all category for the remaining funds).6 The set contains both live and
dead funds. Returns and assets under management (AUM) are reported monthly, and returns are
net of management and incentive fees.
III.B. Hedge fund database vintages
Hedge fund data providers update their databases from time to time. These updates not only
include the incremental changes since the previously published version, but also the entire history
of returns for each fund. This allows us to compare reported histories across vintages of these
databases at various points in time. We compare a total of 40 vintages of the di¤erent databases
between July 2007 and May 2011.7 At each of these vintages v 2 f1; 2; : : : 40g, we track changes to
returns for all available databases. Not every database is updated with the same periodicity, and in
those cases the newer vintage is simply set to the previous one, thus forcing zero detected changes.
We apply some standard lters to the data before analysis. First, we remove 82 funds with very
large or small returns to eliminate a possible source of error (truncating between monthly return
limits of -90%, and +200%).8 Second, we remove 186 funds that report data only quarterly. Third,
6The mapping between these broad strategies and the detailed strategies provided in the databases is reported in
the Internet appendix.
7Vintages were collected in July 2007, and then monthly from January 2008 to May 2011, with February and
November 2009 omitted due to data download errors.
8Although -100 would be a natural choice, we used -90 to specically remove cases in which data providers use
large negative returns as placeholders for missing observations.
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we remove funds with insu¢ cient return histories (less than 12 months) and missing fund level
data (such as no Strategyor O¤shore indicators recorded). Fourth, as less than one-third of
Morningstar funds passed these quality lters, we remove the remaining 832 Morningstar funds to
ensure su¢ cient depth by database. The nal cleaned data set contains 18,382 unique hedge funds.
Of these funds, 12,128 report returns to two or more vintages of our databases, and this is the nal
sample of hedge funds that we employ in our analysis.
Table I shows some characteristics of the sample of 12,128 funds. (A corresponding table for the
complete set of 18,382 funds is available in the Internet Appendix.) On average, funds report for
six years, have US $138 MM in assets, and generate returns of approximately 0.62% per month.
Just under one-third of them are Funds-of-Funds, with Security Selection and Directional Traders
being the predominant hedge fund strategies represented in the data. Approximately one-third of
the funds are from the TASS database, with the CISDM database accounting for the smallest share
of the four databases represented in our nal sample, at just under 10% of funds.
[Insert Table I here]
III.C. Changes: Revisions, deletions, and additions
We compare return histories across successive vintages and group changes into three categories,
namely, additions, deletions, and revisions. To help elucidate these categories, consider Reti;t;v,
the return for fund i at time t reported in vintage v of the database. We drop i and t for ease
of exposition, and let v   1 indicate the previously available vintage for the database in which
the funds data was reported (this may not necessarily be immediately one vintage prior as not
all databases update simultaneously). An addition implies that a return is added to the funds
history in a later vintage, i.e., Retv 1 was not in the database, but Retv is present. Clearly there
are legitimate circumstances in which this would happen, such as when a new fund launches, or
when new return updates are provided for months between the dates at which the two vintages were
captured. In order to rule these cases out when counting additions, we exclude all fund launches
(i.e., cases in which the entire fund history appears in a vintage), and exclude return months within
12 months from the prior vintage v   1 (to avoid picking up late reporting).9 A deletionimplies
9For example, consider the case in which vintage v   1 for a fund was captured in June 2009, and this vintage
shows fund histories up to February 2009. The next vintage v is captured in August 2009 and this vintage shows fund
histories up to July 2009. We would disregard any additions of data occurring after the month of June 2008 when
computing the additions for this fund. So for example, if March 2009 and April 2009 returns are missing in v   1
but present in v, these months would not be counted as additions, to ensure that we do not capture late updates of
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that a return goes missing between vintages, i.e., Retv 1 was reported but Retv was not. Finally,
we dene as revisions cases in which both Retv 1 and Retv are available, but are not equal to
each other. These revisions constitute the main focus of our analysis. As mentioned above, we
lter out small changes (less than 1 basis point) that may be attributable to rounding, and for our
main analysis we focus on revisions that relate to returns that are over three months old, and do
not count as revisions those pertaining to more recent returns. The motivation for this lter is that
most hedge fund databases report returns that are net of fees, and since hedge fund fees are most
often performance-linked, recent returns may be subject to innocuous revisions arising from this
source. We discuss this di¤erence further below.
Table II shows the prevalence of these three di¤erent types of changes to fundsreturn histories.
Fully 49% of our sample of 12,128 funds have one of the three types of changes described above
(labelled Any Change). Of these, revisions of pre-existing data are the most frequent, at 45%,
followed by deletions at 8%, and additions at 3%. (Some funds have multiple types of changes, and
so the sum of the individual categories is greater than the Any Changeproportion.) This large
percentage of funds with revisions demonstrates that this is a widespread problem: funds that have
had at least one change in their reported history manage around 46% of the average total assets
under management in the hedge fund universe (this number peaks at $1.8 trillion in June 2008).
Panels B and C of Table II report summary statistics on the size of revisions observed in our
sample. We observe that 45% (6,906 funds) of funds revise their returns at least once by at least
one basis point, and 28% of funds revise at least once by at least 50 basis points. Panel C reveals
that the mean absolute revision is 91 basis points. To provide an appropriate comparison, the mean
monthly return across hedge funds is 62 basis points, as reported in Table I, i.e., lower than the
mean absolute monthly revision. The revisions that we detect are therefore substantial.
Panel D of Table II reports on the recencyk of the revisions that we detect in our data, dened
as the di¤erence between the date of the return and the date at which a revision was detected. For
example, if the return for the month of January 2008 was revised between the December 2008 and
January 2009 vintages of data, then this revision would have k = 12 months. Each of the columns
of Panel D shows the proportion of revising funds remaining once we exclude revisions near the
vintage date (for example, our main analyses are for k > 3; where we ignore revisions of returns that
occur within three months of the date of the return). As we increase k, the proportion of funds that
returns by the funds manager to the database provider. Our focus for additions is backlling of past history rather
than short-term lags in fund reporting. See Aragon and Nanda (2011) on strategic reporting delays for poor returns.
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are agged as having revised their returns declines, from 57% in total before any k lter is imposed,
down to 28% when we ignore any revision within a year of the return date. Almost one half of the
return revisions in our sample relate to returns that are more than 12 months in the past. Presaging
results from later in the paper, it seems unlikely that these revisions are merely corrections of data
entry errors, or a simple consequence of illiquid positions being marked-to-market.
Panel E of Table II attempts to determine whether the revisions that we nd in our data are
mainly attributable to common data entry errors. We consider three such errors: sign changes
(where the revised return is identical to the original return except for the sign), decimal place
errors (where the revised return di¤ers from the original return by exactly a factor of 0.01, 0.1, 10
or 100), and transposition errors (where adjacent digits in the original return are transposed in the
revised return). We nd that these contribute only a negligible fraction of the observed revisions 
only 3.2% of funds have one of these types of errors, compared with the 44.9% of funds that have
revised their returns at least once. Thus these common types of data entry errors do not appear
to be the primary source of the return revisions that we uncover in our data.
[Insert Table II here ]
In the Internet Appendix, we also show the prevalence of return revisions by strategy, which
reveals that while there is a degree of heterogeneity across strategies, even such relatively liquid
strategies such as managed futures and global macro have substantial fractions of revisers. We
study the determinants of revising behavior, including strategy a¢ liations, in more detail using a
probit model described in the next section.
III.D. Hedge fund return factors
To make appropriate risk adjustments in analyzing portfolio performance for the revising and
non-revising funds, we calculate alphas via the widely-used Fung and Hsieh seven-factor model
for hedge fund returns (Fung and Hsieh (2001)). The Fung-Hsieh factors have been shown to
have considerable explanatory power for hedge fund and fund-of-fund returns. They comprise
four market related factors: an equity market factor (S&P 500); equity size factor (Russell 2000
less S&P 500); bond market factor using a constant-maturity adjusted ten-year Treasury bond
yield; bond credit spread factor, using change in Moodys BAA credit spread over a constant-
maturity adjusted ten-year Treasury bond yield; and three trend-following strategy factors formed
from excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddle options for bonds (PTFSBD), currencies
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(PTFSFX), and commodities (PTFSCOM)10. We use tradeable versions of the bond market and
bond credit spread factors, to facilitate cleaner interpretations of the alpha in these models. In
robustness checks, we also add an eighth factor to the Fung-Hsieh set, namely, MSCI Emerging
Market index returns; and employ the Fama-French-Carhart and Pastor-Stambaugh models as
alternative risk-adjustment models.
IV. Methodology
We begin by documenting the characteristics of funds that are prone to return history changes,
focusing our analysis on the most prevalent category of changes, namely revisions. This analysis
of characteristics helps us to shed light on the incentives for funds to engage in revising behavior.
We then go on to analyze the determinants of the size and sign of revisions, documenting the
di¤erences between initially perceived and nal histories. This enables a better understanding of
how an investor using the database would see di¤erent pictures of hedge fund performance if he
or she had employed di¤erent vintages of the data. Finally, we form portfolios of reviser and non-
reviser funds to ascertain the information content of revisions for future performance and shortfalls.
IV.A. Which funds revise?
We estimate a fund-vintage level probit regression, explaining a revision indicator variable Revi;v
for fund i at vintage v, which takes the value of 1 for any fund which experiences a revision
of returns between two successive vintages of data, and 0 otherwise. Our explanatory variables
include a number of fund characteristics measured at vintage v 1, which are described below, and
collectively denoted by the vector Xi;v 1:11
Revi;v = + Revi;v 1 +X 0i;v 1 + ui;v (IV.1)
The right-hand-side variables include a lag of the dependent variable, to investigate whether
revisions are autocorrelated across vintages, i.e., whether funds that have revised returns in the
past are likely to do so again in the future. We employ assets under management (AUM) to study
10Data for the trend following factors can be found on David Hsiehs website
(http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/sdah7/HFRFData.htm). Datastream and the Federal Reserve website are
sources for the equity and bond factors respectively.
11Standard errors are clustered by vintage to control for the possibility that there are certain periods in which
unexplained revisions are more likely to be prevalent. The internet appendix also presents results which explain the
prevalence of additions, deletions and any change,a catch-all category encompassing all three types of changes.
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whether changes are more likely to occur for larger or smaller hedge funds, ranking funds by their
AUM computed using vintage v 1. We also use the average of all available returns and recent (past
12 month) returns for each fund, again computed using data from vintage v  1. This is to capture
the possibility that weaker performing funds might resort to changes to recast their histories. Third,
we use the standard deviation of all available returns, to capture the fact that funds with more
volatile returns might experience pressure to delete or recast disappointing performance. Fourth,
we use a measure of return smoothing suggested by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), namely
the rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of all available returns. In all cases in which we employ
cross-sectional ranks, these are standardized between 0 and 1. Fifth, we include a variable which
computes the number of returns in fund is history up to vintage v. This is to control for the purely
mechanical possibility that if there is a small xed chance of data capture error, then a longer
return history provides more exposure to return revisions. Of course, this is also a measure of the
age of a fund, so this variable has multiple interpretations.
In addition to these variables computed from return and AUM histories, we also consider a
variety of fund characteristics as explanatory variables. We include strategy xed e¤ects in our
specications to control for the possibility that di¤erences in volatility and liquidity occasioned
by the use of these di¤erent strategies, as well as di¤erential access to information about these
strategies (for example, underlying returns for obscure investments by Emerging Markets funds
may be di¢ cult to independently verify) might lead to di¤erences in the propensity to alter data.
We include database xed e¤ects since the controls, such as the verication of returns pre-loading,
implemented by each database vendor may vary, thus inuencing the propensity for changes. We
employ an indicator for whether the fund is o¤shore or onshore, as funds in o¤shore jurisdictions
may be subject to less scrutiny, and condition on the lockup restrictions imposed by the fund on
its investors  these restrictions provide liquidity safeguards for the fund manager but also may
allow managers to hide from the reputational consequences of changing data within the period of
the lockup. We also include an indicator for whether the fund has a hurdle rate provision, or any
audit information available in the database.12
Finally, two fund characteristics deserve special mention, as they help us better understand
the incentives for fund managers to revise returns. The rst is a dummy variable which indicates
12Underlying databases di¤er in the types and level of information they provide, with some providing the date of
last audit, other providing annual audit ags, and yet others providing auditor names. Our indicator takes the value
1if any audit information is available for the fund, and zero otherwise. The internet appendix contains descriptive
statistics for several of these variables.
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whether a given fund experienced a change of management company or a change of manager. The
inclusion of this variable allows us to explore the possibility of an operational risk(in the sense of
Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008)) explanation for revisions, focusing specically on
mergers, changes of management, and takeovers of funds. Following such events, we hypothesize
that new management might potentially be interested in a fresh start,revamping the accounting,
marking-to-market, auditing, and compliance practices of their newly acquired funds.
The second characteristic that we include is a dummy which takes the value of one if a fund
has a high-water-mark provision. The inclusion of this variable has to do with a second possible
explanation for revisions in particular, with the potential reduction in high-water marks associated
with retrospective negative return revisions. Managers may have greater incentives to revise past
returns downwards when they are well below their high-water marks, so as to reset the level at
which they begin earning performance fees. We defer further discussion of these variables to our
discussion of the results from estimation.13
IV.B. Determinants of the size and direction of revisions
Having determined which funds revise, we turn next to understanding the impact of revising history
on the historical performance record of funds. We do so by comparing the initially reported return
for fund i in month t with the same fund-month return as seen in the last database vintage in which
it appears. This analysis attempts to answer the following question: if an investor only looked at a
return expressed by the funds portfolio manager the rst time it was made public, how does this
di¤er from what the investor might see in the database at the last available vintage?
Our next step is to condition the return di¤erences occasioned by revisions on various fund
characteristics and period xed e¤ects. The dependent variable in these regressions is the average
di¤erence, for all years in which a fund experienced return revisions, between the nal set of annual
returns provided by a fund and the rst set of annual returns provided by the same fund for the
same year. For example, if a fund initially reported 6% average annual return for year t, and at
the nal vintage this average stood at 4%, then the return di¤erence variable would be -2%.
In these specications, we only include periods in which the fund had at least 6 months of
return observations, to reduce the noise in the dependent variable. We explain both the absolute
13A theoretical model of the optimal amount of misreporting, in terms of the incentives to honestly report or
to over- or under- report returns, may shed some light on the trade-o¤s faced by managers, and is left for future
research.
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value of all such di¤erences as well as the signed revisions on the independent variables. Period
dummies include crisis dummies for the 1998-1999 period, the 2000-2001 period, and the 2008-2009
period. Several of the remaining regressors have been described earlier, with three new additions,
namely the rank of ows experienced by the fund relative to all other funds in the same year; the
management fee; and the incentive fee of the fund.
IV.C. Are revisions informative about future performance?
Our nal question is whether knowing that a fund has revised its past performance constitutes
useful information about its future performance. The null hypothesis here is that these revisions
are innocuous and provide no information about future returns. One alternative is that they are
an indicator of either poor operational controls or of dishonesty, both of which provide negative
information about revising funds (as in Brown et al. (2008)). A third possibility is that revisions
are a sign of honesty, in the sense that revisers fess upto past mistakes. In this case, we might
expect performance to be higher for revisers than non-revisers.
To consider these hypotheses rigorously, we employ two methods to determine the performance
di¤erentials between revising and non-revising funds. Our rst approach is to form portfolios of the
returns of funds based on their revising behavior, allocating funds to one of two groups, reviser
funds that have revised at least once, and non-reviserfunds that have had no revisions up until
a given vintage. At the rst vintage, by denition, all funds are non-revisers. At each subsequent
vintage, once we observe revising behavior, we allocate funds into these two groups, moving several
funds from the non-reviser portfolio to the reviser portfolio at each step. Once a fund is categorized
as a reviser, we track all its subsequent returns in the reviser portfolio.
Note that this is a real-time strategy: consider the example of a fund making its rst ever return
revision, say of its previously reported January 2007 return, in the August 2008 database vintage.
Once we detect this historical return revision, we immediately classify the fund as a reviser. The
reviser portfolio will then include the funds returns from September 2008 until the end of our
sample period, and the non-reviser portfolio will no longer track its returns from September 2008
onwards. Thus, at each time period, the non-reviser portfolio contains funds that have never
revised data in any previous vintages, although it could contain funds that are yet to be identied
as revisers. Within each portfolio, we weight all monthly returns of funds equally, computing a
time-series of portfolio returns.14 We can then look at whether there are di¤erences in the returns
14 In Section VI.C we consider using the median of the returns on the reviser and non-reviser funds to address
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of reviser and non-reviser portfolios, and risk-adjust these return di¤erences in various ways.
We also use the cessation of reporting to a database as a sign of future performance a key,
though not the sole, reason for this is fund liquidation. We compute the liquidation probabilities
for revisers and non-revisers, at horizons ranging from 6 to 30 months. Given the turbulent period
that our sample covers, we compute these probabilities starting from six di¤erent dates (June 2008
to December 2010).15
V. Results
V.A. Which funds revise?
Table III shows the results of estimating the probit regression equation (IV.1) for revisions. (The
results for other change types, including whether a fund made any one of the three di¤erent types
of changes, can be found in the internet appendix.) These regressions present the marginal e¤ects
of each continuous right hand side variable, that is, the change in probability in the dependent
variable that results from an innitesimal change in each of these variables. For dummy variables,
such as o¤shore, the e¤ect is captured for the discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1.
Table III reveals that asset size, prior year return rank, and return autocorrelation are positive
and signicant determinants of a funds propensity to report a change in history.16 Ang, Gorovyy
and van Inwegen (2011) show that hedge fund leverage is negatively related to fund return volatility
and size. Taken together with the results from the probit, this suggests that leverage is very likely
lower for funds with a greater propensity to revise. This evidence appears quite similar to the
nding in Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) that leverage is lower for problem
funds than for nonproblemfunds.
The indicator for whether the fund revised returns in the previous vintage is highly signicant,
revealing that some funds are regular revisers of their returns. The number of returns present
for a fund has a signicant e¤ect on the propensity to make a revision, although this could be
simply a mechanical e¤ect as described above. Turning to the strategy indicators, Funds-of-Funds
show the highest chance of reporting changes, which is perhaps unsurprising, as Fund-of-Fund
performance numbers are a function of underlying hedge fund performance numbers, suggesting
concerns about outliers driving the results, and show that this is not an issue in our sample.
15For example, the liquidation probabilities for both revisers and non-revisers are much higher in the period starting
December 2008 than for the period starting June 2009.
16Although these marginal e¤ects are focused on the median rank, we conrm in the appendix that these e¤ects
are present when considering other quantiles.
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that their revisions may simply be a function of revisions in the hedge funds that they hold.17
An increase in the total restrictions (lockup plus redemption notice period) on removing capital
from the fund has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the propensity to report changes in histories.
This may be correlated with greater asset illiquidity, as suggested by Aragon (2007), or constitute
evidence that having a longer period in which to hideprior to withdrawals by investors shields
funds from the adverse consequences of revisions.
The presence of audit information, reected in the audit ag, has a large positive and signicant
coe¢ cient. At rst glance this seems counter-intuitive, as one might expect that funds not subject to
audits would have more latitude to change returns. However, it may be the case that auditing could
trigger corrections in returns alternatively frequent changes in returns might prompt investors to
press for funds to undergo audits.
This auditresult is similar to the result we nd for changes of management company or fund
manager. We nd that a fund experiencing a change of management is roughly 10% more likely
to revise its past returns, holding all else constant. This result is strongly statistically signicant
in addition to its economic importance, and provides evidence in favour of the manager change
hypothesis outlined earlier, namely that new management might potentially be interested in a fresh
start, revamping the accounting, marking-to-market, auditing, and compliance practices of their
newly acquired funds which in turn triggers a set of revisions to past returns. This is not just
driven by a small set of funds over the sample period, 21% (13%) of revising (non-revising) funds
experienced a change of management company or fund manager. Note that these are downward-
biased estimates, as only roughly 50% of the sample funds sourced from various databases record
any manager name information at all.
Finally, we nd that funds with a high-water mark are 10% more likely to revise than those
without a high-water mark. This is an important nding to which we return below.
[Insert Table III here.]
V.B. Determinants of the size and direction of revisions
We now turn to explaining the size and direction of revisions. As a rst step, we take all 5,446
reviser funds and construct a portfolio using their reported returns, and report these returns using
17 In Table A.16 in the internet appendix, we present results corresponding to Table III with Funds of Funds removed
from the sample. The results are very similar and all of the main conclusions hold.
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two di¤erent sets of data, namely the very rst vintage of returns for each fund, and the last
vintage available for these funds, once the impact of all revisions has been incorporated. We plot
the returns on this portfolio in Figure 1. While the rst vintage appears in July 2007, revisions
occur across the entire possible range of return history from 1994 to 2011, hence this gure plots
these two alternative reported histories.
The gure shows clearly that the cumulative di¤erence between nal and initial returns has
a signicant negative trend. What a prospective investor infers about fund performance depends
on when he or she sees it, apparently, and (especially in periods of stress, as we shall see later)
last-reported performance is signicantly lower than initially reported performance. This suggests
the danger of prospective investors being wooed into making decisions based on initially reported
histories which are then subsequently revised.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
While it is tempting to infer a great deal from this plot, it is certainly consistent with multiple
possibilities. The rst is dishonesty  that is, performance is reported to be higher than actual
in order to increase commitments to funds, and subsequently revised back once many years have
elapsed. A second is that changes in management or auditors, as we detected earlier in Table III
cause re-evaluations of accounting techniques and past reported performance gures, generating
signicant revisions to previously optimistic assessments in the future. Third, fee revisions may
cause a chain of NAV re-valuations with consequences for older performance numbers, a possibility
for which we attempt to control a little later in the paper. Fourth, illiquidity and the consequent
possibility of original estimates being revised upon nally realized valuations is also a possibility.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the revisions pertain to periods many years in the
past in some cases, up to 15 years, making it harder to explain all revisions as consequences of
later marking to market, and even if the illiquidity explanation is the proximate cause, there is
clearly a signicant positive bias in initial estimates. Finally, another possibility is that valuation
errors of both types may occur, but fund managers may have greater incentives to correct them
downwards rather than upwards. That is, acknowledging overestimation of past returns may allow
managers to push historical high-water-marks down, thus allowing the earlier collection of incentive
fees. Conversely, acknowledging underestimation of past returns requires payments to investors
(without even accounting for high-water-marks), hence there may be relatively fewer incentives to
do so, although there may be high value to showing a rosier set of past performance numbers to
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prospective investors.18
We explore this nal explanation, which gains support from the higher propensity of funds with
high-water-mark provisions to revise detected in Table III further in Table IV, which focuses on
the relationship of revisions to the existence of a high-water mark provision in the fund. The table
shows that when funds with a high-water mark revise returns, their average return revision is  62
basis points, in contrast with funds without a high-water mark, whose average return revision is
+40 basis points, a di¤erence of over 100 basis points. This important result adds more subtlety to
the result in Figure 1, that the average revision across all funds appeared to be negative. When we
condition on the presence of a high-water mark in the fund, the picture becomes very clear: funds
with an incentive to revise returns below high-water marks revise downwards on average, whereas
funds without high-water marks revise returns upwards, making past returns appear higher in
subsequent revisions.
[Insert Table IV here ]
Our next step, as described in the methodology section, is to construct calendar-year returns for
any fund/year that contained at least one revised return using both initial and nally reported data,
and explain the di¤erence between the two, i.e., nal less initial, using a number of variables. Panel
A of Table V, which analyzes the absolute value of these di¤erences, shows that return revisions
are on average large. Moreover, these revision are larger in absolute value during crises, with all
three of the crisis dummy variables having signicantly positive coe¢ cients. Of these, the very
largest revisions pertain to the 1998-1999 crisis period, adding 1.58% to the already large baseline
revision. This is followed by the 2000-2001 NASDAQ crisis period with roughly 77 bp per annum,
and the most recent crisis, with 68 bp per annum.
Turning to the fund characteristics, it appears that o¤shore funds have larger absolute revisions,
in line with our conjecture that potentially weaker enforcement in such jurisdictions may lead
to more important revisions. Perhaps surprisingly, funds with audit information appear to be
associated with revisions that are larger in absolute value, suggesting that at least some revisions
may be occasioned by the enhanced scrutiny generated by recent audits or the appointment of a
new auditor. In keeping with this result, Jylha (2011) nds that funds with prominent auditors
have more misreporting discontinuities, although Liang (2003) nds no such evidence in his earlier
study of the auditing of TASS returns. Finally, the table shows that smaller funds, and those with
18We thank Istvan Nagy for suggesting this explanation.
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high incentive fees, have larger revisions, which is consistent with greater incentives for dishonesty,
as well as with the possibility of larger revaluations when fee structures change.
Panel B of Table V explains return di¤erences, rather than their absolute values, and nds
that during crisis periods, in particular the 2000-01 and 2008-09 periods, revisions are signicantly
negative, meaning that the initially reported return tends to be revised downwards in subsequent
vintages of the database, as seen earlier. The table also shows that large funds with high manage-
ment fees tend to make upward revisions.
[Insert Table V here]
We now turn to evaluating the predictive content of revisions, constructing portfolios of revisers
and non-revisers as successive vintages reveal their identities.
V.C. The future performance of revisers and non-revisers
Figure 2 plots the cumulative performance of the reviser and non-reviser portfolios constructed as
described in section IV.C. Panel A shows that the returns of the revisers are appreciably lower than
those of non-revisers. This di¤erence is economically substantial with a cumulative di¤erence of
12.4% emerging after just over three years.19 This substantial return di¤erence between the two
portfolios, at rst glance suggests that our classication of funds into revisers and non-revisers has
substantial predictive content. However, in order to better understand these di¤erences, and to
ensure that they are not simply driven by di¤erences in the risk loadings or characteristics of funds,
we need to risk-adjust (and potentially characteristic-adjust) these returns.20
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Table VI presents results from a variety of models for risk adjusting the return di¤erence between
the reviser and non-reviser portfolios, and shows that the ndings are very robust to this choice.
This table reports only the alpha from these regressions; the full set of results, including the
19Note that even in the early periods of the out-of-sample period, we still have a substantial number of rms in
the reviserportfolio, growing from 274 revising rms detected in the rst month.
20 In the Internet Appendix, we also plot cumulative ows for both reviser and non-reviser portfolios, using data
from the nal vintage. The reviser portfolio experiences very signicant outows beginning in August-September
2008, during the Lehman collapse. The impact of big outows and subsequent re sales of fund assets might be one
potential reason for the poor performance of the reviser portfolio (see Coval and Sta¤ord (2007), and Jotikasthira
et al. (2011) for evidence of the importance of this mechanism). The ows may also simply be responding to poor
performance, a la DeLong et al. (1990).
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coe¢ cients on the various factors, are reported in the Internet Appendix. The alpha of the non-
reviser-reviser di¤erence from the Fung-Hsieh seven factor model is 0.28% per month, or 3.3% per
annum net of all fees and costs. We plot cumulative alpha (i.e., + "t for each time-series portfolio
regression) estimated using the Fung-Hsieh seven factor model in Panel B of Figure 2, and nd
that it resembles the plot of raw returns: the non-revisers consistently outperform the revisers.
We also consider risk adjustment using the Fama-French three factor model, as well as augmented
variants that include momentum and liquidity factors, and nd that the future poor performance
of the reviserportfolio is not explained by these alternative models. Finally, Panels C through
E consider various robustness checks, which are discussed in a separate section below.21
[Insert Table VI here.]
Having established that the reviser/non-reviser return di¤erential is not explained by di¤erences
in exposure to risk factors, we next consider several possibilities for drivers of this result. One
inference is to consider revisions as a sign of dishonesty or poor operational controls within the
fund. For example, when management changes occur in the fund (an important determinant of
revising behavior), this could result in changes to operational controls going forward. While these
may be put in place to generate better future performance, the very fact that changes may have been
required highlight potentially important structural deciencies in the funds previous accounting
practices that need to be remedied, and hence the presence of operational risk which may manifest
itself in low future returns.
If either dishonesty or poor operational controls were the driver of revisions, we might also
expect to see di¤erences in the tail risk of revisers relative to non-revisers the dramatic outows
from the reviser portfolio suggest that these di¤erences may be stark. To verify this, we employ
the historical simulation method, in which we estimate the bottom decile of performance from
all returns seen from the beginning of the reviser portfolio up until each date, moving through
time (this is done at the individual fund level within each of the portfolios). We also average the
returns falling below these empirically computed decile thresholds to arrive at an expected shortfall
measure.
Figure 3 plots these measures for the cross section of underlying funds of the respective portfo-
lios. We caution here that we have a relatively small sample of data, implying that our estimates
21Table A.18 in the internet appendix presents results that correspond to Table VI but with funds of funds excluded.
The risk-adjusted excess performance is smaller for non-FOFs, around 0.24% per month compared with 0.28% per
month, however the di¤erence in performance is still strongly statistically signicant across all risk adjustment models.
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of tail quantities are somewhat imprecise, and these plots should be taken as suggestive rather
than denitive. Nevertheless, the gures show that the empirical bottom decile and the expected
shortfall of the reviser portfolio is virtually always below the non-reviser portfolio over the entire
period for both portfolio and cross-sectional measures. There is a dramatic divergence during the
crisis with the empirical percentile and the expected shortfall collapsing in the months of October
and November 2008. While the tail risk of the revisers at the fund level recovers and seems quite
similar to that of the non-revisers in the more recent periods, this could be attributed to the weakest
funds having been eliminated from the portfolio during the period of the crisis. Overall, it appears
from this analysis that investors are at greater downside risk when investing in funds that revise
their returns. We also checked the results using lower percentile thresholds, and the conclusions
are similar.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
The recovery of the tail risk in the reviser portfolio towards the end of the sample period that
we consider does suggest that these funds might hold more illiquid assets in their portfolios, which
simultaneously drives revisions, sharp falls in asset values, and subsequent recoveries. In this sense,
we might simply be picking up di¤erences in asset holdings. The next section explores this and
other potential determinants of our ndings.
Finally, we attempt to link our reviser ag with a more objective measure of future performance
than self-reported returns. Table VII looks at liquidation probabilities of reviser and non-reviser
funds, through the probability that a fund will cease reporting to a hedge fund database. It should
be noted that funds may cease reporting to a database for reasons other than fund liquidation,
and so this analysis comes with a caveat, however it provides another piece of evidence about the
future performance of reviser funds relative to non-reviser funds. Given the turbulent period that
our sample covers, we compute these probabilities starting from six di¤erent dates (June 2008 to
December 2010), and for ve horizons, ranging from six to thirty months. For example, in the six
month period up to December 2008, a combined 7,533 funds report returns. Twelve months later,
26.5% of these funds had ceased reporting. Of these funds, 2,140 were revisers and had a higher
liquidation rate of 32.1% after twelve months, compared to 24.3% of non-reviser funds.
Averaging across the start date for the analysis, we nd that the liquidation probabilities for
revisers range from 15.7% to 61.4%, while the corresponding gures for non-revisers are 11.9% and
51.6%. The di¤erence between these probabilities ranges from 4% to as high as 10%, and is strongly
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statistically signicant for all ve horizons. As a proportion of the average liquidation probability
at a given horizon, increases of this size represent an increase of 20 to 30% in the liquidation
probability for reviser funds relative to non-reviser funds.
[Insert Table VII here.]
Thus detecting that a fund has revised one of its past returns helps us to predict that it will
signicantly underperform funds that have never revised their returns, and signicantly increases
the probability that the fund will cease reporting to a database, potentially due to liquidation. The
usefulness of the revision indicator in the future is, of course, susceptible to changes in investor
and manager behavior: as investors become aware of the information content of this indicator, the
incentives to revise past returns may in turn change.
VI. Robustness checks
In this section we present the results of a battery of robustness checks of our main empirical ndings.
The internet appendix presents additional robustness checks and analyses.
VI.A. Varying the minimum size of the revision
The rst parameter that we vary is the minimum size of a change for it to be labelled a revision.
This is one way to control for the possibility that our results may be driven by the initial marking
to market of illiquid assets. It also allows us to see if we can obtain stronger predictability signals
by conditioning on larger revisions. Our main analysis uses a 1 basis point threshold for identifying
revisions, and we increase this threshold to 10, 50, and 100 basis points as alternatives, in each case
only classifying as revisions changes in returns across successive vintages that are greater than the
threshold.
Panel C of Table VI reveals that the return di¤erences reported in Panel A of the same table
persist, with the estimated monthly alphas across these thresholds ranging from 0.25% to 0.29%.
Indeed, our results appear slightly stronger when we only consider funds with larger revisions in
our set of revisers.
VI.B. Varying the minimum age of the revision
Our next robustness check is to give a free passto revisions that occur close to the vintage date.
As explained earlier, the recency, k; of a revision is the number of months between the date of
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the return date and the date of the vintage in which the revision was observed. The parameter k
is useful for evaluating various di¤erent hypotheses. By setting k to be large, we can evaluate only
those funds that revise ancient history.Moreover, using a large k eliminates the incorporation of
funds into the reviser portfolio that relatively quickly revised returns. In other words, we can give
a free pass to such small k revisers, to allow for the possibility that funds may employ estimated
returns for recent time periods, which could be revised on account of accounting procedures, or
because of the re-valuation of illiquid securities in light of more accurate information. The larger we
set k, the less likely that we are picking up such revaluation revisions. In this robustness check we
consider setting k  1 (i.e., including all revisions) and also k > 3 (our baseline in the paper), k > 6
and k > 12, to identify revisions older than one quarter, six months, and one year respectively.
Panel D of Table VI, shows that our results become slightly stronger as k increases, peaking at
k > 6, and descending slightly for k > 12, but still higher than unrestricted k  1. This suggests
that revisions of very recent returns are more often innocuous (in the sense that they do not help
predict future, poor, returns) than revisions of older returns. It is worth noting here that we take
additional care with two cases: rst, for each k, we ensure that funds revising returns more recent
than the threshold k are not included in the non-reviser portfolio  that is, they do not factor
into any of our calculations to ensure that we compare truenon-revisers with high-k revisers.
Second, in any given vintage, we do not include funds in both reviser and non-reviser portfolios
if they simultaneously conduct low- and high-k revisions.22 This is to allow for the possibility of
a benign AUM or valuation error found months ago that could, in some cases, cause a cascade
of revisions. For example, an incorrectly processed share corporate event could trigger o¤ such a
case. Despite these exclusions, high-k revisions are associated with signicant return di¤erentials
between revisers and non-revisers.
VI.C. Controlling for extreme returns
One may worry that the poor future performance of hedge funds that have revised their returns is
attributable to a few extreme returns. Therefore, we consider the reviser/non-reviser performance
di¤erential using the median return for each of these groups rather than the mean return. Of
course, the median return cannot be interpreted as the return on a portfolio of hedge funds, unlike
the mean, but it does allow us to investigate the sensitivity of our results to rare, large returns.
22Of course, if they only conducted a high-k revision in a subsequent vintage they would then be included in the
reviser portfolio.
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Panel E of Table VI shows that the risk-adjusted median return is slightly smaller than the risk-
adjusted mean return (around 0.20% per month compared with 0.28%), but is strongly signicant
across all risk adjustment models. Thus the negative future performance of revising funds is not
attributable to the extreme poor performance of a few revising funds or, conversely, to the extreme
high performance of a few non-revising funds.
VI.D. Two-way sorts on fund characteristics
In our earlier probit analysis, we found that reviser and non-reviser funds have di¤erent charac-
teristics.23 While the factor loadings of the return di¤erence between these groups should cap-
ture such di¤erences, we perform an additional test to check that our results are not driven by
such characteristic-based di¤erences. To do so, we double-sort by these characteristics and the
reviser/non-reviser classication. We consider ve such fund characteristics, three of which have
been identied in the literature as relevant for expected returns, namely, the rst autocorrelation of
fund returns (a measure of the smoothness of the funds returns a la Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2004), the total lockup period imposed by the fund (see Aragon (2007)) and the size of the fund,
to control for the impact of capacity constraints (see Fung et al. (2008)). We also double-sort by
the funds total return volatility and the history length (a measure of age) of the fund.
Given the nature of the fund characteristics that we employ for these double sorts, this analysis
also allows us to investigate whether fund asset illiquidity (correlated with both the GLM measure,
and lockup periods, according to the extant literature) helps explain the reviser-non-reviser di¤er-
ence. Specically, if this were the case, we would expect to see no di¤erences between revisers and
non-revisers within each portfolio of funds (independently) double-sorted by illiquidity proxies (au-
tocorrelation, lockup, fund size), but pronounced di¤erences across these illiquidity-sorted groups.
If, however, we continue to see variation in reviser and non-reviser portfolio returns within these
groups, this would suggest that the revisions provide orthogonal information to underlying asset
illiquidity.24
The alphas of the return di¤erences between reviser and non-reviser funds of these double-sorted
portfolios are reported in Table VIII, and are all statistically signicant, with a single exception. We
23The internet appendix presents a formal comparison of some key characteristics of reviser and non-reviser funds.
24Of course if these proxies for illiquidity are not as good a measure of underlying asset illiquidity as our revisions
measure, it is possible that the explanation might still apply. In that case, the interpretation is that we have found
a better measure of asset illiquidity, although the other robustness checks (especially varying k) militate against this
explanation.
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nd that reviser-non-reviser di¤erences are particularly stark among funds that have high return
autocorrelation, but alphas for less-smooth (low Rho1) revisers are lower, but not signicantly
lower, than those for less-smooth non-revisers. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), for example,
highlight that their measure of return smoothness could be either on account of true asset illiquidity
or deliberate return-smoothing among funds so our result that smooth-return-revisers have worse
performance than smooth-return-non-revisers may allow investors to discriminate between these
two possibilities for observed return smoothness. We also nd that small funds and young funds
show stark di¤erences between reviser and non-reviser portfolio returns. This suggests that when
revising behavior is detected in funds with relatively higher incentives to establish their reputations,
it might well be construed as a particularly negative signal about their future return prospects.
[Insert Table VIII here.]
In addition to the robustness checks described above, we also conduct a series of other robustness
checks which are described and presented in the Internet Appendix to the paper.
VI.E. Comparison with other ags for problem funds
Bollen and Pool (2012) propose a variety of agsfor potential fraudulent activity based just on
reported returns, and link these to an indicator for whether the fund has been charged with legal or
regulatory violations. To see whether our ag for whether a fund has revised any of its past returns
is explained by any of these existing statistical ags we conduct the following analysis: we estimate
the Bollen and Pool ags for each of the funds individually, and then aggregate funds into reviser
and non-reviser groups to examine the proportion of funds that are agged as having a signicant
fraud indicator in each group.
To implement these tests we impose a minimum of 24 months of data, which reduces our sample
of funds from 12,128 to 10,584. The tests we use are Perc. Negative,Count Zeros,String,
Num. Pairs, Perc. Repeats, Uniform, Benford, AR(1), and CAR(1). as in Bollen
and Pool (2012). The header to Table IX describes the construction of each of these variables.
The table shows that four of these ags are more signicant for reviser funds than non-reviser
funds, specically, the Perc. Negative, AR(1), Perc. Repeats and Count Zeros. The remaining
ve tests are not signicantly di¤erent across revisers and non-revisers (and two of them go in
the wrong direction). None of the tests discriminate in exactly the same way as our reviser ag.
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The confusion matrix25 implied by the proportions in Table X yields accuracy measures (which
corresponds to a correlation measure) of between 0.42 and 0.54. Thus funds identied as problem
funds using the methods of Bollen and Pool (2012) have about 50% overlap with funds that we
identify as revisers. Our reviserag does have some correlation with some previously proposed
ags, but it contains substantial unique information.
[Insert Table IX here.]
VII. Conclusions
This paper examines the reliability of voluntary disclosures of performance information by hedge
funds. We do so by tracking revisions to historical performance records by hedge funds in several
publicly available hedge fund databases. We nd evidence that in successive vintages of these
databases, older performance records (pertaining to periods as far back as fteen years) of hedge
funds are routinely revised. These revisions are widespread, with nearly 50% of the 12,128 hedge
funds in our sample (managing around 45% of average total assets) having revised their historical
returns at least once. These revisions are not merely random reporting errors: they are partly
predictable using information on the characteristics and past performance of hedge funds, with
larger, more volatile, and less liquid funds more likely to revise their returns. Initially reported
performance track records present a far rosier picture of historical performance than track records
that include all changes made in subsequent data vintages, especially for funds that have high-
water mark provisions. Perhaps most interestingly, detecting that a fund has revised one of its
past returns helps us to predict that it will subsequently underperform funds that have never
revised their returns, and increases the probability that the fund will cease reporting to a database,
potentially due to liquidation.
Recent policy debates on the pros and cons of imposing stricter reporting requirements on
hedge funds have raised various arguments. The benets of disclosures include market regulators
having a better view on the systemic risks in nancial markets, and investors and regulators being
able to better determine the true, risk-adjusted, performance of the fund. The costs include the
administrative burden of preparing such reports, and the risk of leakage of valuable proprietary
information, in the form of trading strategies and portfolio holdings. Our analysis suggests that
25This matrix is used to compare two discrete classications of a variable, in this case whether a fund is a problem
fund or not. The accuracymeasure is simply the sum of the proportions where the two classications agree, and
can be interpreted as a correlation measure for these classications.
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mandatory, audited disclosures by hedge funds, such as those recently proposed by the SEC, would
be benecial to regulators. We believe that it would also be worth considering how these reporting
guidelines, which currently only apply to fundsdisclosures to regulators, could also apply to dis-
closures to prospective and current investors so as to help them make more informed investment
decisions.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics: Dataset 
 
This table shows summary statistics on funds that we employ in our analysis, with time-series statistics in Panel 
A computed only using the May 2011 (final) vintage of the 40 vintages of data that we capture. AUM refers to 
assets under management. Panel A shows broad statistics on returns and AUM, Panel B shows the strategies into 
which the funds are classified, and Panel C shows the databases from which the funds are sourced. 
 
Panel A: Fund Summary Statistics 
  
Num. 
Funds 
Average 
Fund AUM 
US$ MM 
Average 
Fund 
Return 
Average Fund 
History 
Length 
(years) 
 
  12,128 138.25  0.618 6.133  
  
  
 
         
Panel B: Fund Strategies 
  Fund Count Count%       
   Security Selection 1,762  14.53%       
   Macro 685  5.65%       
   Relative Value 191  1.57%       
   Directional Traders 1,503  12.39%       
   Fund-of-Funds 3,822  31.51%       
   Multi-Process 1,371  11.30%       
   Emerging 612  5.05%       
   Fixed Income 597  4.92%       
   Other 141  1.16%       
   Managed Futures 1,444  11.91%       
   Total 12,128  100.00%       
  
 
 
       
Panel C: Funds by Database 
  Fund Count Count%       
   TASS 4,585  37.81%       
   HFR 2,983  24.60%       
   CISDM 1,106  9.12%       
   BarclayHedge 3,454  28.48%       
   Total 12,128  100.00%       
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Table II 
Summary Statistics on Return Changes across Vintages 
This table shows summary statistics of changes in returns (additions, deletions, and revisions) between 
successive vintages. Panel A shows counts of the three different types of changes separately, as well as “Any 
Change.”  Panel B shows the proportion of revising funds with at least one revision that is at least as large as the 
size thresholds listed, Panel C shows various percentiles of (positive, negative and net) revisions, and their 
absolute values. Panel D shows the proportions of revising funds with at least one revision that relates to a return 
that is at least as old as the “recency” thresholds listed, and Panel E explores potential reasons for innocuous 
revisions, namely sign changes, decimal errors, and digit transpositions. 
 
Panel A: Changes Breakdown at Fund Level 
  Fund Count 
Any Change 
Count 
Deletions 
Count 
Additions 
Count 
Revisions  
Count 
Funds  12,128 5,938 976 363 5,446 
% of Funds   49.0% 8.0% 3.0% 44.9% 
 
Panel B: Size of Revisions 
  Revisions Count  
  Fund Count at least 0.01% at least 0.1% at least 0.5% at least 1% 
Funds 12,128 5,446 4,718 3,363 2,581 
% of Funds 44.9% 38.9% 27.7% 21.3% 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for the Distribution of Revisions 
  Revisions 
Absolute 
Revisions 
Positive 
Revisions 
Negative 
Revisions 
Count 63,791 63,791 31,039 32,752 
Mean -0.029 0.908 0.904 -0.912 
Median -0.020 0.140 0.140 -0.140 
95th perc 1.860 3.800 3.776 -0.020 
5th perc -1.957 0.020 0.020 -3.816 
 
Panel D: Recency of Revisions 
  Minimum Recency of Revisions Count  
  Fund Count 
1 or more 
months 
more than 3 
months 
more than 6 
months 
more than 12 
months 
Funds 12,128 6,891 5,446 4,340 3,423 
% of Funds 100.0% 56.8% 44.9% 35.8% 28.2% 
          
Revisions   87,461 63,791 51,426 43,192 
% of Revisions (base)   137.11% 100.00% 80.62% 67.71% 
 
Panel E: Potentially Innocuous Revisions 
  
Reviser 
Count Sign Change Decimal Place 
Digit 
Transposition 
Sign, Decimal, 
or Transpose 
Funds 5,446 154 63 211 390 
% of Funds 44.9% 1.27% 0.52% 1.74% 3.22% 
            
Revisions 63,791 179 405 250 834 
% of Revisions 100% 0.28% 0.63% 0.39% 1.31% 
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Table III 
Probit Regression for Revisions  
This table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression on fund-vintage data. The dependent variable 
takes the value of 1 if a fund revised data between vintage v-1 and vintage v. The independent variables are 
average returns across all dates up to v-1; past twelve months average returns; average AUM; standard deviation 
of returns; autocorrelation of returns, all measured as ranks relative to the other funds in the data; the number of 
return observations in the return history of the fund; an independent variable that takes the value of 1 if the fund 
experienced a data revision in the prior vintage, and 0 otherwise; a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is located offshore; a total restrictions variable (measured as the sum of the reported lockup and 
redemption notice periods); a flag which takes the value of 1 for the fund if there is any information pertaining to 
audits available in any of the databases; dummies indicating whether the fund has a high-water mark, hurdle rate 
provision, or experienced a change in management company or fund manager during its lifetime. We also 
include database and strategy fixed-effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the independent 
variable for a discrete change in any independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for 
continuous independent variables. Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by vintage. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Avg. AUM (Rank) (v-1) 0.032*** (6.828) 
Avg. Ret (Rank) (v-1) 0.006 (1.465) 
Prior Year Avg. Return (Rank) (v-1) 0.037*** (4.934) 
Ret. Std. (Rank) (v-1) 0.004 (1.214) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) (v-1) 0.014*** (4.135) 
Return History Length (v-1) 0.000** (2.228) 
Prior Vintage Revision Indicator 0.244*** (11.433) 
Offshore -0.006*** (-2.928) 
Total Restrictions 0.002*** (4.484) 
Audit Flag 0.021*** (6.675) 
Hurdle Rate Provision 0.004 (1.029) 
Mgmt. Company or Manager Change 0.097*** (3.382) 
High-Water Mark 0.010*** (3.187) 
   
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR 0.009** (2.478) 
CISDM -0.055*** (-5.472) 
BarclayHedge 0.028*** (2.811) 
 
Strategy Fixed Effects     
Macro 0.025*** (7.061) 
Relative Value 0.007 (1.566) 
Directional Traders -0.007*** (-2.655) 
Funds-of-Funds 0.051*** (6.705) 
Multi-Process 0.011*** (3.111) 
Emerging 0.004 (1.258) 
Fixed Income 0.008*** (3.010) 
Other 0.016*** (3.548) 
Managed Futures 0.039*** (5.996) 
    
N 334,419    
Pseudo R2 0.171   
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Table IV 
High-Water Marks and Revisions 
 
This table examines the relationship between revisions and the presence of a high-water mark 
provision. Panel A conditions revising behavior on the presence of a high-water mark. For example, 
there are 7,977 funds with a high-water mark, and the proportion of revisers in this group is 49.35%. 
Panel B shows the sign and size of the average revision conditional on the presence of a high-water 
mark, separately averaged across positive and negative revisions, as well as across all revisions. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively for tests of difference in means. 
 
 
Panel A: Propensity to Revise Conditional on a High-Water Mark 
  Fund Count 
Reviser 
Count 
% of 
Category 
All Funds  12,128 5,446 44.90% 
High-Water Mark 7,977 3,937 49.35% 
No High-Water Mark 4,151 1,509 36.35% 
Difference 13.00%*** 
 
 
Panel B: Size of Revision Conditional on a High-Water Mark 
  
 
Average Size of Revision 
 
  
Positive 
Revision 
Negative 
Revision 
Net 
Revision 
High-Water Mark 2.465 -3.483 -0.618 
No High-Water Mark 4.033 -3.092  0.397 
Difference     -1.015*** 
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Table V 
Explaining Revision Return Differences 
 
This table conditions the return differences occasioned by revisions on various fund characteristics and period 
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the average difference, for all years in which a fund experienced return 
revisions, between the final set of annual returns provided by a fund and the first set of annual returns provided 
by the same fund for the same year. For example, if fund X initially reported 6% average annual return for year t, 
and at the final vintage, this average stood at 4%, then the return difference variable would be -2%. We only 
include periods in which the fund had at least 6 months of return observations, to reduce the noise in the 
dependent variable. Panel A takes the absolute value of all such differences as the dependent variable, and Panel 
B conditions the signed revisions on the independent variables. Period dummies include crisis dummies for the 
1998-1999 period, the 2000-2001 period, and the 2008-2009 period. The remaining regressors have been 
described earlier in these tables, with three new additions, namely the rank of prior flows and returns 
experienced by the fund relative to all other funds in the same year; the Management fee and the Incentive fee of 
the fund. t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the fund-level. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Absolute Value of Differences 
   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat   
  Constant 1.170 ( 20.277) *** 1.252 ( 5.345) *** 
  Crisis dummy1: 1998-99 1.580 ( 2.891) *** 1.577 ( 2.919) *** 
  Crisis dummy2: 2000-01 0.770 ( 2.435) ** 0.744 ( 2.368) ** 
  Crisis dummy3: 2008-09 0.677 ( 8.330) *** 0.669 ( 8.174) *** 
  
  Offshore 0.300 ( 2.695) *** 
  Total Restrictions -0.022 (-1.251) 
  High-Water Mark or Hurdle    -0.206 (-1.609)  
  Audit  0.356 ( 2.431) ** 
  Management Fee 0.028 ( 0.284) 
  Incentive Fee 0.022 ( 2.795) *** 
  Asset t-1 rank -1.122 (-5.462) *** 
  Return prior year t-1 rank    -0.295 (-1.859) * 
  Flow prior year t-1 rank 0.062 ( 0.462) 
  
  N 7,628 7,628 
  Adjusted R2 0.012 0.026 
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Panel B: Return Differences 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat   
  Constant -0.007 (-0.129)   -0.149 (-0.725)   
  Crisis dummy1: 1998-99 -0.139 (-0.216)   -0.164 (-0.253)   
  Crisis dummy2: 2000-01 -0.809 (-2.403) ** -0.819 (-2.445) ** 
  Crisis dummy3: 2008-09 -0.375 (-4.412) *** -0.370 (-4.348) *** 
            
  Offshore       -0.133 (-1.503)   
  Total Restrictions       0.009 ( 0.527)   
  High-Water Mark or Hurdle       -0.129 (-1.114)   
  Audit        -0.038 (-0.294)   
  Management Fee       0.155 ( 1.873) * 
  Incentive Fee       -0.001 (-0.108)   
  Asset t-1 rank       0.256 ( 1.742) * 
  Return prior year t-1 rank       0.117 ( 0.719)   
  Flow prior year t-1 rank       -0.176 (-1.140)   
              
  N 7,628     7,628     
  Adjusted R2 0.003     0.004     
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Table VI 
Do Revisions Predict Future Returns? 
 
This table presents the estimated alpha from regressions of the difference in returns between the non-reviser and 
reviser portfolios over the 40 months from January 2008 to the end of the sample period, May 2011, on several 
different sets of factors, and conducts several robustness checks of the results. Panel A employs the Fung-Hsieh 
8 factor model, and subsets of it. Panel B employs the Fama-French 3 factor model, adds a momentum factor, 
and finally adds the Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity factor. Panel C shows the impact of using different size 
thresholds for flagging a revision as important, with the first column (1 bp) of Panel C reproducing the result 
from Panel A. Panel D shows the impact of using different “recency” thresholds for revisions, giving a “free 
pass” to revisions that relate to recent returns. The second column (3 months) of Panel D reproduces the result 
from Panel A. Panel E shows the significance of the differences in returns between the non-reviser and reviser 
portfolios using the portfolio’s median return. Newey-West standard errors (with three lags) are employed to 
assess statistical significance. Regression alphas are shown, with t-statistics in parentheses beneath them. (Full 
estimation results are presented in the Internet Appendix.) Significance denoted by stars at the 10% (*), 5% (**) 
and 1% (***) levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Return differences (Fung-Hsieh Model) 
  Constant Market FH 4 FH 7 FH 8 
Alpha  0.309***   0.309***   0.277***   0.278***   0.279***  
    (3.805)   (5.133)   (3.526)   (3.053)   (3.077)  
            
Panel B: Return differences (Fama-French 3 factors  
+ Momentum + Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Model) 
   FF3 FF3 + Mom 
FF3 + Mom + 
Liquidity   
Alpha   0.302***   0.276***   0.287***    
    (3.777)   (4.596)   (4.973)    
           
Panel C: Size of Revision (Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
  Minimum Size of Revisions 
   1 bp 10 bp 50 bp 100 bp 
  Alpha  0.278***   0.292***   0.262***   0.250***  
    (3.053)   (3.362)   (3.247)   (2.638)  
 
Panel D: Recency of Revision (Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
  Minimum Recency of Revisions 
   
1 or more 
months 
more than 3 
months 
more than 6 
months 
more than 12 
months 
  Alpha 0.222*** 0.278*** 0.302*** 0.255*** 
   (2.591) (3.053) (3.193) (2.672) 
  
Panel E: Regressions on Median Return Differences 
(Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
   Constant Market FH 4 FH 7 FH 8 
  Alpha 0.207** 0.213*** 0.196*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 
   (2.382) (3.790) (3.318) (3.218) (3.273) 
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Table VII 
Liquidation Probabilities for Revisers and Non-Revisers 
 
This table shows the liquidation probabilities of the reviser and non-reviser funds. Funds reporting returns are 
classified from the beginning of our vintage sample up to a point in time (reported in the row headers) as revisers 
or non-revisers, and this cohort is tracked over future six monthly horizons until they stop reporting returns. 
Liquidation probabilities are calculated relative to the initial number of funds in the reviser cohort, reported in 
the column labelled “Fund Count”. Liquidation rates are averaged across cohorts, and the difference between the 
reviser and non-reviser average liquidation rates is shown below the reviser and non-reviser statistics. The row 
labelled “Average All Funds” shows the average liquidation rate of the universe of funds. t-statistics of the 
difference in means are shown in parentheses and *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
              
  Liquidation Probabilities: Months ahead 
Classification Period  Fund Count 6 12 18 24 30 
              
Revisers             
  Up to Jun 2008 298  0.185  0.336  0.419  0.534  0.614  
  Up to Dec 2008 2,140  0.234  0.321  0.401  0.471    
  Up to Jun 2009 2,251  0.115  0.219  0.314      
  Up to Dec 2009 2,411  0.116  0.229        
  Up to Jun 2010 2,445  0.133          
  Up to Dec 2010 2,256            
  Average   0.157  0.276  0.378  0.503  0.614  
              
Non-Revisers             
  Up to Jun 2008 8,577  0.138  0.308  0.374  0.428  0.516  
  Up to Dec 2008 5,393  0.176  0.243  0.301  0.419    
  Up to Jun 2009 4,189  0.069  0.130  0.277      
  Up to Dec 2009 3,773  0.054  0.213        
  Up to Jun 2010 3,080  0.156          
  Up to Dec 2010 2,306            
  Average   0.119  0.224  0.317  0.423  0.516  
              
Difference Revisers and Non-Revisers 0.038  0.052  0.061  0.079  0.098  
    (4.190) (4.174) (3.904) (4.020)  (2.288) 
    *** *** *** *** ** 
       
Average All Funds   0.128  0.239  0.331  0.432  0.519  
Difference as % All Funds Average 29.42% 21.91% 18.33% 18.37% 18.94%
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Table VIII 
Robustness Checks: Liquidity and Fund Characteristics 
 
This table conditions the results in Table VI on the cross section of various fund characteristics. We split both 
revisers and non-revisers by sorting funds on specific characteristics, into groups that are above (Hi) and below 
(Lo) the cross-sectional median of all funds reporting in each period. These characteristics are Rho1 (first return 
autocorrelation); the lockup period as at the last available vintage; fund size (AUM at the end of the prior 
period); Return Std. (return standard deviation); and history length (the number of return observations in the 
return history of the fund). Returns are equally weighted within portfolios. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors (with three lags) are employed to assess statistical significance. Regression 
betas are shown with t-statistics shown in parentheses beneath coefficients. The significance of the alpha is 
denoted by stars at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels respectively. 
 
 
 
  
 
Alpha 
(Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
 
Characteristic 
 
High 
 
Low 
        
Rho1 0.322*** 0.107 
   (-3.467) (-1.275) 
        
Lockup 0.367*** 0.168* 
   (-4.730) (-1.718) 
        
Fund Size 0.142** 0.522*** 
   (-2.166) (-3.150) 
        
Return Std. 0.309*** 0.286*** 
   (-2.633) (-3.318) 
        
History Length 0.120** 0.509*** 
   (-2.200) (-3.474) 
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Table IX 
Fraud Flag Frequencies for Revisers and Non-Revisers 
 
This table shows the proportion of each hedge fund group that triggers the performance flags. The "problem" 
funds in this case are the funds that experienced a revision in their returns in one of the vintages, i.e. Revisers. 
Returns are taken over the full history using the last available vintage.  Funds require at least 24 months of 
returns. A 10% significance level was used for the tests. The tests are from Bollen and Pool (2012): ‘Perc. 
Negative’, the percentage of returns that are negative; ‘AR(1)’, first return autocorrelation; ‘Perc. Repeats’, the 
proportion of returns that are repeated; ‘Count Zeros’, the count of exactly zero values; ‘String’, the count of the 
longest sequence of repeated data; ‘Num. Pairs’, the number of repeated blocks of length two, without counting 
overlaps; ‘CAR(1)’, conditional serial correlation to check smoothing of losses, using the Fung-Hsieh seven 
factor model for the unobserved return; ‘Uniform’, establishing whether the second digit of the value is 
uniformly distributed; and ‘Benford’, establishing whether the second digit of the value follows Benford's Law 
for a second digit. Critical values are obtained using a bootstrap procedure. The stars indicate that the results 
from a test of differences in trigger rejection rates of problem and non-problem funds. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The flags are sorted by difference in proportions 
between reviser and non-reviser funds. 
 
 
 Reviser Funds Non-Reviser Funds   
  Flag (N = 5,055) (N = 5,529) Difference p-value 
  Perc. Negative 0.359 0.251 0.108*** 0.000 
  AR(1) 0.524 0.420 0.105*** 0.000 
  Perc. Repeats 0.203 0.174 0.029*** 0.000 
  Count Zeros 0.180 0.151 0.029*** 0.000 
  String 0.088 0.087 0.002 0.744 
  Num. Pairs 0.035 0.033 0.002 0.623 
  CAR(1) 0.127 0.126 0.001 0.864 
  Uniform 0.129 0.133 -0.004 0.547 
  Benford 0.106 0.114 -0.007 0.240 
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Appendix A 
The Consolidated Hedge Fund Database 
 
As hedge funds can report to one or more databases, the use of any single source will fail to capture the complete 
universe of hedge fund data. We therefore aggregate data from TASS, HFR, CISDM, BarclayHedge and 
Morningstar, which together have 74,742 records of fund entries that comprise administrative information as 
well as returns and AUM data for hedge funds, fund of funds and CTAs. However this number hides the fact that 
there is significant duplication of information, as multiple providers often cover the same fund. To identify all 
unique entities, we must therefore consolidate the aggregated data. To do so, we adopt the following steps: 
 
1. Group the Data: Records are grouped based on reported management company names. To do so, we first 
create a ‘Fund name key’ and a ‘Management company key’ for each data record, by parsing the original 
fund name and management company name for punctuations, filler words (e.g., ‘Fund’, ‘Class’), and 
spelling errors. We then combine the fund and management name keys into 8,390 management company 
groups. 
 
2. De-Duplication: Within a management company group, records are compared based on returns data 
(converted into US dollars), and 27,395 match sets are created out of matching records, allowing for a 
small error tolerance limit (10% deviation) to allow for data reporting errors. 
 
3. Selection: Once all matches within all management company groups are identified, a single record 
representing the unique underlying fund is created for each match set. We pick the record with the longest 
returns data history available is selected from the match set, and fill in any missing administrative 
information using the remaining records in the match set. The process thus yields 27,395 representative 
funds. 
 
We filter the fund data in a few ways to ensure data integrity. For example, removing return outliers and 
quarterly reporting funds, and ensuring funds have sufficient return or asset information. We also remove the 
Morningstar funds (as less than a third passed these filters), to ensure sufficient depth by database. The result is 
18,382 funds. 
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Appendix B 
Strategy Mappings 
 
This table shows the broad strategies to which the underlying source strategies of the database vendors, HFR, 
TASS, CISDM, and BarclayHedge, are mapped. Examples of strategies are shown in the second column; the full 
set of more than 600 mappings is not shown. We also make use of fund type in the source database to aid in 
allocating an appropriate mapping. For example, a CTA with a source strategy dubbed Other will be allocated to 
the Managed Futures strategy with the other CTAs, and not into the Other hedge fund category. 
 
Mapped Strategy Examples of Source Strategies 
  
Security Selection Equity Long/Short, Equity Arbitrage, Equity Long/Short - Growth Bias, Equity 
Market Neutral, Equity Market Neutral - US Value Long/Short 
Macro Global Macro, Global Macro - FX only, Global Macro - Quantitative, Macro - 
Active Trading 
Relative Value Merger Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral - Relative Value, Single Strategy - Event 
Driven Risk Arbitrage, Statistical Arbitrage 
Directional Traders Dedicated Short Bias, Equity Long Only, Equity Long/Short - Long biased, Market 
Timing, Single Strategy - Tactical trading 
Funds-of-Funds (By fund type), Fund of Funds, Fund of Funds - Strategic, Conservative - Absolute 
Return Fund of Funds, Fund of Funds - Nondirectional, Fund of Funds - Derivatives 
Multi-Process Multi-process, Multi Strategy - Arbitrage, Equity Hedge - Multi-Strategy, Event 
Driven Multi Strategy  
Emerging Emerging Markets, Emerging Markets - Central Asia focus, Equity Long/Short - 
Emerging Markets, Emerging Markets - Directional, Emerging Markets - Global 
Fixed Income Convertible Arbitrage, Fixed Income - Arbitrage, Fixed Income - ABS/Sec. Loans, 
Fixed Income - Structured Credit, Global Debt, Distressed Securities - Stressed 
High Yield Bonds 
Other Other, Undefined. 
Managed Futures (By CTA fund type), Managed Futures, Global trend, Discretionary - CTA 
Managed Futures, Systematic - Systematic arbitrage & counter-trend 
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Table A.1 
Listing of Vintage Dates 
 
This table shows the vintage dates of the 40 snapshots. 
 
 
Number Vintage date  Number Vintage date 
1 Jul 2007  21 Sep 2009 
2 Jan 2008  22 Oct 2009 
3 Feb 2008  23 Dec 2009 
4 Mar 2008  24 Jan 2010 
5 Apr 2008  25 Feb 2010 
6 May 2008  26 Mar 2010 
7 Jun 2008  27 Apr 2010 
8 Jul 2008  28 May 2010 
9 Aug 2008  29 Jun 2010 
10 Sep 2008  30 Jul 2010 
11 Oct 2008  31 Aug 2010 
12 Nov 2008  32 Sep 2010 
13 Dec 2008  33 Oct 2010 
14 Jan 2009  34 Nov 2010 
15 Mar 2009  35 Dec 2010 
16 Apr 2009  36 Jan 2011 
17 May 2009  37 Feb 2011 
18 Jun 2009  38 Mar 2011 
19 Jul 2009  39 Apr 2011 
20 Aug 2009  40 May 2011 
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Table A.2 
Summary Statistics, Overall Universe 
 
This table shows summary statistics on funds across the whole universe including funds defunct before the first 
vintage, with time-series statistics in Panel A computed only using the May 2011 (final) vintage of the 40 
vintages of data that we capture. AUM refers to assets under management. Panel A shows broad statistics on 
returns and AUM, Panel B shows the strategies into which the funds are classified, and Panel C shows the 
databases from which the funds are sourced. 
 
Panel A: Fund Summary Statistics 
  
Num.  
Funds 
Average 
Fund AUM 
US$ MM 
Average 
Fund 
Return 
Average Fund 
History 
Length 
(years) 
 
  18,382 104.19 0.640 5.535  
            
Panel B: Fund Strategies 
  Fund Count Count%     
   Security Selection 3,009 16.37%     
   Macro 1,201 6.53%     
   Relative Value 250 1.36%     
   Directional Traders 2,358 12.83%     
   Fund-of-Funds 4,846 26.36%     
   Multi-Process 1,877 10.21%     
   Emerging 821 4.47%     
   Fixed Income 957 5.21%     
   Other 174 0.95%     
   Managed Futures 2,889 15.72%     
   Total 18,382 100.00%     
        
Panel C: Funds by Database 
  Fund Count Count%     
   TASS 6,604 35.93%     
   HFR 4,742 25.80%     
   CISDM 1,698 9.24%     
   BarclayHedge 5,338 29.04%     
   Total 18,382 100.00%       
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Table A.3 
Summary Statistics for Lifetime Variables 
 
This table shows summary statistics of lifetime AUM and return averages, medians and standard deviations; the number of return observations in the 
return history of the fund; and the first sample autocorrelation of returns. (Data used to construct these variables is taken from the final vintage of the 
data.) 
 
  
AUM 
Average 
AUM  
Std. 
AUM  
Median 
Return 
Average 
Return  
Std. 
Return 
Median 
Return Auto-
correlation 
Fund History 
Length 
  
Observations 12,128  12,128  12,128  12,128  12,128  12,128  12,128  12,128  
                  
Mean 190,166,868  101,466,637  172,968,006  0.623  3.794  0.745  0.167  6.133  
Std dev 1,695,475,248  814,738,188  1,641,462,633 1.092  3.215  0.910  0.222  4.086  
                  
99th perc 2,189,444,687  1,212,588,317 2,058,343,660 4.368  15.641  3.741  0.667   17.333  
75th perc 98,771,590  49,480,000  86,378,500  0.973  4.732  1.035  0.314   8.333  
Median 31,453,446  13,216,540  27,118,409  0.532  2.837  0.650  0.168   5.000  
25th perc 9,122,952  3,090,808  7,041,061  0.178  1.788  0.323  0.024   2.917  
1st perc 107,436  1  -    2.107  0.412  1.437  0.393   1.167  
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Table A.4 
Summary Statistics of Revisions by Strategy 
 
This table shows the percentage of funds in each strategy with absolute value revisions of at least 1 bp, 10bp, 
50bp, or 100bp. For example, of the 1,762 Security Selection funds, 40.6% have past history which is revised by 
at least 1 bp, 33.9% by at least 10bp, 24.4% by at least 50 bp, and 18.8% by at least 1%.  
 
    Revisions as % of Funds in Strategy 
Strategy 
Fund 
Count 
at least 
0.01% 
at least 
0.1% 
at least 
0.5% 
at least 
1% 
Security Selection 1,762 40.6% 33.9% 24.4% 18.8% 
Macro 685 43.1% 36.4% 23.2% 17.2% 
Relative Value 191 42.9% 33.5% 23.6% 17.3% 
Directional Traders 1,503 40.0% 32.4% 22.1% 17.0% 
Funds-of-Funds 3,822 54.0% 49.4% 35.9% 27.8% 
Multi-Process 1,371 39.2% 33.5% 23.5% 18.2% 
Emerging 612 41.7% 36.1% 29.1% 23.9% 
Fixed Income 597 44.7% 37.0% 25.5% 18.1% 
Other 141 44.0% 37.6% 29.8% 24.1% 
Managed Futures 1,444 39.4% 33.2% 22.8% 16.8% 
           
All Funds 12,128 44.9% 38.9% 27.7% 21.3% 
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Table A.5 
Probit Regression for Any Changes 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a 
fund had any change (Deletion, Revision or Addition) over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables are lifetime average returns, lifetime average AUM, standard deviation of 
returns, and the autocorrelation of returns, all measured as ranks relative to the other funds in the data; and the 
number of return observations in the return history of the fund. Other relevant fund variables are a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the fund is located Offshore, a total restrictions variable (measured as the 
sum of the reported lockup and redemption notice periods), a flag which takes the value of 1 if there is any 
information pertaining to audits available in any of the databases (and in any of the vintages), and a management 
change flag which takes the value of 1 if the management company or manager name changes across vintages. 
We also include database and strategy fixed-effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the 
independent variable for a discrete change in any independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the 
mean for continuous independent variables. Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by 
database. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) 0.104*** (3.958) 
Lifetime Avg. Return (Rank) -0.063 (-1.003) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.114*** (4.610) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.076*** (4.609) 
Return History Length 0.021*** (4.959) 
Offshore -0.011 (-0.343) 
Total Restrictions 0.018*** (10.711) 
Audit 0.011 (0.474) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.130*** (2.826) 
Any Management Change 0.118*** (4.838) 
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR 0.036 (1.584) 
CISDM -0.130*** (-9.303) 
BarclayHedge -0.091*** (-10.329) 
Strategy Fixed Effects      
Macro 0.034** (2.110) 
Relative Value 0.063** (2.115) 
Directional Traders -0.050 (-1.161) 
Funds-of-Funds 0.163*** (12.104) 
Multi-Process -0.036** (-2.337) 
Emerging 0.029 (1.023) 
Fixed Income 0.033 (1.563) 
Other 0.076 (1.222) 
Managed Futures 0.135*** (4.492) 
    
N 12,128    
Pseudo R2 0.080   
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Table A.6 
Probit Regression for Revisions 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a 
fund had revised data over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables 
are lifetime average returns, lifetime average AUM, standard deviation of returns, and the autocorrelation of 
returns, all measured as ranks relative to the other funds in the data; and the number of return observations in the 
return history of the fund. Other relevant fund variables are a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is located Offshore, a total restrictions variable (measured as the sum of the reported lockup and redemption 
notice periods), a flag which takes the value of 1 if there is any information pertaining to audits available in any 
of the databases (and in any of the vintages), and a management change flag which takes the value of 1 if the 
management company or manager name changes across vintages. We also include database and strategy fixed-
effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete change in any 
independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent variables. 
Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by database. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) 0.104*** (3.958) 
Lifetime Avg. Return (Rank) -0.063 (-1.003) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.114*** (4.610) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.076*** (4.609) 
Return History Length 0.021*** (4.959) 
Offshore -0.011 (-0.343) 
Total Restrictions 0.018*** (10.711) 
Audit 0.011 (0.474) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.130*** (2.826) 
Any Management Change 0.118*** (4.838) 
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR 0.036 (1.584) 
CISDM -0.130*** (-9.303) 
BarclayHedge -0.091*** (-10.329) 
Strategy Fixed Effects      
Macro 0.034** (2.110) 
Relative Value 0.063** (2.115) 
Directional Traders -0.050 (-1.161) 
Funds-of-Funds 0.163*** (12.104) 
Multi-Process -0.036** (-2.337) 
Emerging 0.029 (1.023) 
Fixed Income 0.033 (1.563) 
Other 0.076 (1.222) 
Managed Futures 0.135*** (4.492) 
    
N 12,128    
Pseudo R2 0.080   
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Table A.7 
Probit Regression for Additions 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a 
fund had added past data over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 otherwise. (Additions exclude fund 
launches; the first time a return appears for a fund; and additions within 12 months of the vintage v-1 date so as 
to avoid picking up late reporting.) The independent variables are lifetime average returns, lifetime average 
AUM, standard deviation of returns, and the autocorrelation of returns, all measured as ranks relative to the other 
funds in the data; and the number of return observations in the return history of the fund. Other relevant fund 
variables are a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the fund is located Offshore, a total restrictions 
variable (measured as the sum of the reported lockup and redemption notice periods), a flag which takes the 
value of 1 if there is any information pertaining to audits available in any of the databases (and in any of the 
vintages), and a management change flag which takes the value of 1 if the management company or manager 
name changes across vintages. We also include database and strategy fixed-effects in the regressions. dF/dx 
shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete change in any independent dummy variable from 0 to 
1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent variables. Robust standard errors control for 
heteroskedasticity, and cluster by database. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) -0.009*** (-2.675) 
Lifetime Avg. Ret (Rank) -0.005 (-0.518) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.010 (1.074) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.002 (0.247) 
Return History Length 0.003*** (6.577) 
Offshore 0.000 (0.074) 
Total Restrictions -0.000 (-0.228) 
Audit 0.008 (1.179) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.006*** (3.198) 
Any Management Change -0.000 (-0.020) 
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR -0.011*** (-7.178) 
CISDM -0.024*** (-20.236) 
BarclayHedge -0.007*** (-3.834) 
Strategy Fixed Effects      
Macro -0.007 (-1.156) 
Relative Value -0.000 (-0.032) 
Directional Traders -0.006 (-1.158) 
Funds-of-Funds 0.008*** (2.604) 
Multi-Process -0.007*** (-2.931) 
Emerging 0.002 (0.442) 
Fixed Income 0.012 (0.766) 
Other 0.056*** (23.926) 
Managed Futures 0.007 (1.244) 
    
N 12,128    
Pseudo R2 0.068   
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Table A.8 
Probit Regression for Deletions 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a 
fund had deleted data over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables 
are lifetime average returns, lifetime average AUM, standard deviation of returns, and the autocorrelation of 
returns, all measured as ranks relative to the other funds in the data; and the number of return observations in the 
return history of the fund. Other relevant fund variables are a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is located Offshore, a total restrictions variable (measured as the sum of the reported lockup and redemption 
notice periods), a flag which takes the value of 1 if there is any information pertaining to audits available in any 
of the databases (and in any of the vintages), and a management change flag which takes the value of 1 if the 
management company or manager name changes across vintages. We also include database and strategy fixed-
effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete change in any 
independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent variables. 
Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by database. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) -0.004 (-0.280) 
Lifetime Avg. Return (Rank) -0.042 (-1.300) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.026* (1.861) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) -0.020 (-1.297) 
Return History Length 0.003*** (8.643) 
Offshore 0.023*** (2.726) 
Total Restrictions -0.002 (-0.624) 
Audit -0.012** (-1.991) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.008* (1.814) 
Any Management Change 0.023* (1.683) 
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR -0.005*** (-3.375) 
CISDM -0.054*** (-23.777) 
BarclayHedge -0.039*** (-14.693) 
Strategy Fixed Effects      
Macro -0.001 (-0.068) 
Relative Value 0.038** (2.196) 
Directional Traders 0.007 (1.055) 
Fund-of-Funds 0.015** (2.248) 
Multi-Process -0.025*** (-4.994) 
Emerging 0.010 (0.931) 
Fixed Income 0.015 (0.668) 
Other 0.002 (0.078) 
Managed Futures 0.008* (1.850) 
    
N 12,128    
Pseudo R2 0.032   
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Table A.9 
Explaining Revision Return Differences – Interactions Detail 
 
This table conditions the return differences occasioned by revisions on various fund characteristics and period 
fixed effects. (This table, similar to Table V, holds the details of the interactions between strategy and crisis 
periods). The dependent variable is the average difference, for all years in which a fund experienced return 
revisions, between the final set of annual returns provided by a fund and the first set of annual returns provided 
by the same fund for the same year. For example, if fund X initially reported 4% average annual return for year t, 
and at the final vintage, this average stood at 6%, then the return difference variable would be 2%. We only 
include periods in which the fund had at least 6 months of return observations, to reduce the noise in the 
dependent variable. Panel A takes the absolute value of all such differences as the dependent variable, and Panel 
B conditions the signed revisions on the independent variables. Period dummies include crisis dummies for the 
1998-1999 period, the 2000-2001 period, and the 2008-2009 period. The remaining regressors have been 
described earlier in these tables, with three new additions, namely the rank of flows experienced by the fund 
relative to all other funds in the same year; the Management fee and the Incentive fee of the fund. t-statistics, 
shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the fund-level. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
{Table A.9 is presented on the following two pages} 
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Panel A: Absolute Value of Differences 
  Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat   
  Constant 1.182 ( 20.358) *** 1.325 ( 5.615) ***
  Crisis1 *  Security Selection 1.129 ( 1.078)   1.186 ( 1.161)   
  Crisis1 *  Macro 2.258 ( 1.744) * 2.322 ( 1.849) * 
  Crisis1 *  Relative Value -     -     
  Crisis1 *  Directional Traders 4.800 ( 2.158) ** 4.681 ( 2.152) ** 
  Crisis1 *  Funds-of-Funds 1.026 ( 1.004)   1.212 ( 1.202)   
  Crisis1 *  Multi-Process -0.638 (-1.460)   -0.884 (-1.640)   
  Crisis1 *  Emerging -     -     
  Crisis1 *  Fixed Income -     -     
  Crisis1 *  Managed Futures -0.524 (-1.858) * -0.588 (-1.398)   
  Crisis2 *  Security Selection 0.275 ( 0.437)   0.404 ( 0.645)   
  Crisis2 *  Macro 1.683 ( 1.380)   1.536 ( 1.259)   
  Crisis2 *  Relative Value -     -     
  Crisis2 *  Directional Traders 1.553 ( 1.641)   1.481 ( 1.653) * 
  Crisis2 *  Funds-of-Funds 0.791 ( 0.737)   0.897 ( 0.859)   
  Crisis2 *  Multi-Process -0.469 (-1.353)   -0.480 (-1.318)   
  Crisis2 *  Emerging 1.492 ( 1.570)   1.091 ( 1.160)   
  Crisis2 *  Fixed Income -     -     
  Crisis2 *  Managed Futures 0.370 ( 0.599)   0.248 ( 0.403)   
  Crisis3 *  Security Selection 0.846 ( 3.471) *** 0.717 ( 2.859) ***
  Crisis3 *  Macro 0.443 ( 1.707) * 0.346 ( 1.325)   
  Crisis3 *  Relative Value 0.184 ( 0.635)   0.097 ( 0.340)   
  Crisis3 *  Directional Traders 0.662 ( 2.898) *** 0.605 ( 2.677) ***
  Crisis3 *  Funds-of-Funds 0.548 ( 4.982) *** 0.721 ( 6.229) ***
  Crisis3 *  Multi-Process 0.701 ( 3.257) *** 0.673 ( 3.125) ***
  Crisis3 *  Emerging 2.538 ( 4.166) *** 2.422 ( 3.982) ***
  Crisis3 *  Fixed Income 0.672 ( 2.075) ** 0.643 ( 2.006) ** 
  Crisis3 *  Managed Futures 0.339 ( 1.857) * 0.079 ( 0.409)   
              
  Offshore       0.247 ( 2.240) ** 
  Total Restrictions       -0.028 (-1.607)   
  High-Water Mark or Hurdle       -0.252 (-1.976) ** 
  Audit        0.276 ( 1.868) * 
  Management Fee       0.035 ( 0.346)   
  Incentive Fee       0.025 ( 2.926) ***
  Asset t-1 rank       -1.132 (-5.571) ***
  Return prior year t-1 rank       -0.241 (-1.520)   
  Flow prior year t-1 rank       0.070 ( 0.524)   
            
  N 7,628     7,628     
  Adjusted R2 0.021     0.034     
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Panel B: Return Differences 
  Coeff t-stat   Coeff t-stat   
  Constant -0.016 (-0.298)   -0.017 (-0.083)   
  Crisis1 *  Security Selection 0.823 ( 0.670)   0.854 ( 0.693)   
  Crisis1 *  Macro -3.425 (-2.634) *** -3.541 (-2.841) ***
  Crisis1 *  Relative Value -     -     
  Crisis1 *  Directional Traders 1.168 ( 0.396)   1.253 ( 0.424)   
  Crisis1 *  Funds-of-Funds -0.365 (-0.323)   -0.464 (-0.400)   
  Crisis1 *  Multi-Process -0.354 (-0.808)   -0.250 (-0.483)   
  Crisis1 *  Emerging -     -     
  Crisis1 *  Fixed Income -     -     
  Crisis1 *  Managed Futures 0.165 ( 0.410)   0.055 ( 0.132)   
  Crisis2 *  Security Selection -0.402 (-0.630)   -0.371 (-0.583)   
  Crisis2 *  Macro -1.781 (-1.403)   -1.748 (-1.388)   
  Crisis2 *  Relative Value -     -     
  Crisis2 *  Directional Traders -1.801 (-1.679) * -1.711 (-1.613)   
  Crisis2 *  Funds-of-Funds -0.265 (-0.336)   -0.355 (-0.471)   
  Crisis2 *  Multi-Process -0.438 (-1.229)   -0.357 (-0.980)   
  Crisis2 *  Emerging -0.593 (-0.478)   -0.484 (-0.392)   
  Crisis2 *  Fixed Income -     -     
  Crisis2 *  Managed Futures -0.317 (-0.342)   -0.441 (-0.449)   
  Crisis3 *  Security Selection 0.029 ( 0.136)   0.116 ( 0.544)   
  Crisis3 *  Macro -0.341 (-1.172)   -0.338 (-1.127)   
  Crisis3 *  Relative Value -0.360 (-1.252)   -0.297 (-1.002)   
  Crisis3 *  Directional Traders -0.098 (-0.435)   -0.034 (-0.150)   
  Crisis3 *  Funds-of-Funds -0.772 (-6.621) *** -0.859 (-7.122) ***
  Crisis3 *  Multi-Process -0.379 (-1.771) * -0.343 (-1.581)   
  Crisis3 *  Emerging -0.749 (-1.125)   -0.698 (-1.044)   
  Crisis3 *  Fixed Income 0.508 ( 1.818) * 0.576 ( 2.043) ** 
  Crisis3 *  Managed Futures -0.001 (-0.004)   0.038 ( 0.188)   
              
  Offshore       -0.092 (-1.073)   
  Total Restrictions       0.012 ( 0.712)   
  High-Water Mark or Hurdle       -0.054 (-0.466)   
  Audit        -0.075 (-0.571)   
  Management Fee       0.177 ( 2.178) ** 
  Incentive Fee       -0.017 (-2.098) ** 
  Asset t-1 rank       0.283 ( 1.942) * 
  Return prior year t-1 rank       0.118 ( 0.713)   
  Flow prior year t-1 rank       -0.174 (-1.130)   
            
  N 7,628     7,628     
  Adjusted R2 0.008     0.009     
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Table A.10 
Multinomial Logistic Regression on Revision Direction 
 
These are coefficients from a multinomial logit regression on revision direction relative to no change at all. 
Revision Direction is the net number of positive or negative revisions experienced by a fund. The base case of 
zeros refers to funds having no revisions at all. Funds with exactly equal positive and negative revisions were 
dropped (4.6% of funds). Regressors are as in Table IV. Standard errors are estimated by clustering by database. 
 
Panel A: More Negative Revisions 
-1 to 0 Coeff Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank)(v-1) 1.079 5.550 *** 
Lifetime Avg. Ret (Rank) (v-1) -0.788 -2.640 *** 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) (v-1) 0.510 4.070 *** 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) (v-1) 0.555 8.590 *** 
Return History Length(v-1) 0.009 4.160 *** 
    
Offshore -0.095 -2.030 ** 
Total Restrictions 0.001 4.190 *** 
Audit 0.934 1.730 * 
    
Database Fixed Effects    
HFR 0.100 3.270 *** 
CISDM -0.027 -0.060 
BarclayHedge 0.768 24.340 *** 
Strategy Fixed Effects 
Macro 0.326 5.390 *** 
Relative Value 0.668 4.240 *** 
Directional Traders -0.161 -2.040 ** 
Funds-of-Funds 0.884 9.470 *** 
Multi-Process 0.136 1.460 
Emerging 0.429 6.740 *** 
Fixed Income -0.084 -0.450 
Other 0.295 0.950 
Managed Futures 0.548 2.120 ** 
Constant -4.073 -9.170 *** 
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Panel B: More Positive Revisions 
+1 to 0 Coeff Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank)(v-1) 1.100 3.380 *** 
Lifetime Avg. Ret (Rank) (v-1) 0.071 0.570 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) (v-1) 0.065 0.270 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) (v-1) 0.587 6.600 *** 
Return History Length(v-1) 0.008 4.890 *** 
    
Offshore -0.167 -4.340 *** 
Total Restrictions 0.001 5.040 *** 
Audit 0.690 1.430 
    
Database Fixed Effects    
HFR -0.201 -7.590 *** 
CISDM -0.467 -1.200 
BarclayHedge 0.262 4.430 *** 
    
Strategy Fixed Effects    
Macro 0.415 15.030 *** 
Relative Value 0.882 2.240 ** 
Directional Traders 0.088 2.340 ** 
Funds-of-Funds 0.946 15.150 *** 
Multi-Process 0.359 2.850 *** 
Emerging 0.651 9.220 *** 
Fixed Income 0.160 0.870 
Other 0.663 1.320 
Managed Futures 0.519 2.930 *** 
    
Constant -3.832 -12.430 *** 
    
 
Panel C: Regression Statistics 
N 17,587     
Pseudo R2 0.092     
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Table A.11 
Change in Predictions for Revision Direction 
 
The panels below show changes in predicted probabilities in the revision direction multinomial logit regression, 
where -1 indicates more negative revisions, 1 for more positive revisions in the fund and 0 for no revisions at all. 
Panel A shows impact of the Audit flag dummy and Panel B shows a change from 1st to 3rd quartile in lifetime 
ranks. Confidence intervals are estimated by the delta method. 
 
Panel A: Audit 
Audit flag            
  Audit No Audit Diff 95% CI for Diff  
Pr(y=-1|x): 0.189 0.093 0.095 [ 0.0810, 0.1098]  
Pr(y=1|x): 0.182 0.115 0.067 [ 0.0518, 0.0824]  
Pr(y=0|x): 0.630 0.792 -0.163 [-0.1821, -0.1428]  
         
Panel B: Change in quartiles 
Lifetime Average AUM    
  AUM 0.75 AUM 0.25 Diff 95% CI for Diff  
Pr(y=-1|x): 0.186 0.129 0.057 [ 0.0462, 0.0679]  
Pr(y=1|x): 0.194 0.133 0.061 [ 0.0496, 0.0719]  
Pr(y=0|x): 0.620 0.738 -0.118 [-0.1323, -0.1032]  
   
Lifetime Return Average  
  Ret 0.75 Ret 0.25 Diff 95% CI for Diff  
Pr(y=-1|x): 0.131 0.184 -0.053 [-0.0636, -0.0421]  
Pr(y=1|x): 0.168 0.154 0.015 [ 0.0036, 0.0258]  
Pr(y=0|x): 0.700 0.662 0.038 [ 0.0238, 0.0524]  
   
Lifetime Return Standard Deviation  
  Std 0.75 Std 0.25 Diff 95% CI for Diff  
Pr(y=-1|x): 0.173 0.140 0.033 [ 0.0217, 0.0438]  
Pr(y=1|x): 0.160 0.162 -0.002 [-0.0133, 0.0092]  
Pr(y=0|x): 0.667 0.698 -0.031 [-0.0455, -0.0159]  
   
Lifetime Return First Autocorrelation  
  Rho 0.75 Rho 0.25 Diff 95% CI for Diff  
Pr(y=-1|x): 0.171 0.142 0.029 [ 0.0184, 0.0397]  
Pr(y=1|x): 0.178 0.146 0.033 [ 0.0219, 0.0435]  
Pr(y=0|x): 0.651 0.713 -0.062 [-0.0759, -0.0477]  
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Table A.12 
Characteristics of the Reviser and Non-Reviser funds 
 
This table shows the differences in characteristics between the reviser and non-reviser groups of funds using the 
status of the funds at the last vintage. The non-reviser funds at this stage have never revised between vintages. 
Once a fund revises a return it joins the reviser portfolio and it stays out of the non-reviser group. Lifetime AUM 
and return measures are used for the funds, not the period in which they belonged to the group. There are 5,417 
non-reviser funds out of the 12,128 reporting funds. t-statistics of the differences between groups assume a 
common variance. 
 
  Revisers Non-Revisers   
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev t-stat diff p-value 
Lifetime AUM Average $m 183.61 1,500.29  198.29 1,909.94   -0.474 0.636
Lifetime Return Average 0.629 0.992  0.615 1.205   0.697 0.486
Lifetime Return Std. 3.764 3.095  3.831 3.358   -1.143 0.253
Return Autocorrelation 0.187 0.217  0.142 0.224   11.218 0.000
Return History Length (years) 6.685 4.211  5.449 3.817   16.743 0.000
Total Restrictions (quarters) 2.256 2.921  1.552 2.396   14.275 0.000
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Table A.13 
Do Revisions Predict Future Returns? – Detail 
 
This table contains the regression details from Table VI, which regresses the difference in returns between the 
reviser and non-reviser portfolios over the 40 months from January 2008 to the end of the sample period, May 
2011, on several different sets of factors. Panel A employs subsets, followed by the full set, of factors from the 
Fung-Hsieh model. Panel B employs the Fama-French 3 factor model, adds a momentum factor, and finally adds 
the Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity factor. Panel C employs Fung-Hsieh subsets, like Panel A, but uses the original 
Fung-Hsieh non-tradeable bond factors. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors (with three lags) are employed to assess statistical significance. Regression betas are shown with t-
statistics shown in parentheses beneath coefficients. The significance of the alpha is denoted by stars at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Return differences (Fung-Hsieh Model) 
  Factors Constant Market FH 4 FH 7 FH 8 
  Constant 
 
0.309*** 
 
0.309*** 
 
0.277*** 
 
0.278***  
 
0.279*** 
    (3.805)   (5.133)   (3.526)   (3.053)   (3.077)  
  SP500 -  -0.001   -0.007   -0.005   -0.010   
    -   (-0.063)  (-0.510)  (-0.435)   (-0.845) 
  SMB -  -  0.025   0.027   0.027   
    -   -   (1.521)   (1.476)   (1.428)  
  BOND10YR -  -  -0.180   -0.064   -0.070   
    -   -   (-0.996)  (-0.228)   (-0.256) 
  CREDSPR -  -  0.016   0.026   0.021   
    -   -   (0.552)   (0.564)   (0.472)  
  PTFSBD -  -  -  0.007   0.019   
    -   -   -   (0.011)   (0.029)  
  PTFSFX -  -  -  0.788   0.786   
    -   -   -   (1.156)   (1.192)  
  PTFSCOM -  -  -  -0.842   -0.819   
    -   -   -   (-1.081)   (-1.109) 
  EMERGING -  -  -  -  0.005   
    -   -   -   -   (0.601)  
       
  N 40 40 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2  -2.62% -3.46% -5.48% -8.53% 
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Panel B: Return differences (Fama-French 3 factors + Momentum +  
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Model) 
  Factors FF3 FF3 + Mom 
FF3 + Mom 
+ Liquidity 
  Constant 0.302*** 0.276*** 0.287*** 
  (3.777) (4.596) (4.973) 
  MKTRF -1.321 -2.366 -1.831 
  (-1.044) (-2.503) (-1.981) 
  SMB 1.685 2.193 2.871 
   (1.166) (1.497) (2.307) 
  HML 3.629 1.597 -1.227 
   (2.445) (1.337) (-0.568) 
  UMD - -2.812 -2.663 
   - (-3.539) (-3.539) 
  PSLIQ - - -2.254 
  - - (-2.079) 
  
  N 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2 14.94% 11.73% 10.96% 
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Table A.14 
Robustness Checks: Size and Recency – Detail 
 
This table contains the regression details from Table VII Panel A and B, which conditions the results in Table VI 
on the size and recency of revisions. Panel A shows the impact of using different size thresholds for considering 
revisions as important. For example, the first column (1 bp) of Panel A reproduces the results from Panel A of 
Table VI, and ‘10bp’ only includes funds with revisions which are greater than 10bp in absolute value in the 
construction of the reviser portfolio. Panel B shows the impact of excluding recent revisions near the vintage 
date. For example, the second column (k > 3) of Panel B reproduces the results from Panel A of Table VI, and 
when k > 6 only funds with revisions that occur six months prior to the date of the vintage are included, and 
when k > 12, only funds which revise returns over a year old are included in the construction of the reviser 
portfolio. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (with three lags) are 
employed to assess statistical significance. Regression betas are shown with t-statistics shown in parentheses 
beneath coefficients. The significance of the alpha is denoted by stars at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Size of Revision (Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
  Minimum Significance of Revisions 
  Factors 1 bp 10 bp 50 bp 100 bp 
  Constant  0.278***   0.292***   0.262***   0.250***  
    (3.053)   (3.362)   (3.247)   (2.638)  
  SP500 -0.005   -0.005   -0.024   -0.022   
    (-0.435)   (-0.530)   (-1.890)   (-1.209)  
  SMB 0.027   0.012   -0.006   -0.005   
    (1.476)   (0.494)   (-0.205)   (-0.141)  
  BOND10YR -0.064   -0.134   -0.264   -0.261   
    (-0.228)   (-0.486)   (-0.818)   (-0.692)  
  CREDSPR 0.026   0.020   0.010   -0.010   
    (0.564)   (0.476)   (0.258)   (-0.180)  
  PTFSBD 0.007   -0.026   -0.160   -0.193   
    (0.011)   (-0.048)   (-0.324)   (-0.334)  
  PTFSFX 0.788   1.070   1.568   1.914   
    (1.156)   (2.278)   (2.915)   (2.550)  
  PTFSCOM -0.842   -0.978   -1.862   -2.277   
    (-1.081)   (-1.643)   (-2.297)   (-1.939)  
          
  N 40 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2 -5.48% 3.24% 21.56% 14.45% 
  
 
  
22 
 
Panel B: Recency of Revision (Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
  Minimum Recency of Revisions 
  Factors k = 1 k > 3 k > 6 k > 12 
  Constant  0.278***   0.292***   0.262***   0.250***  
    (3.053)   (3.362)   (3.247)   (2.638)  
  SP500 -0.005   -0.005   -0.024   -0.022   
    (-0.435)   (-0.530)   (-1.890)   (-1.209)  
  SMB 0.027   0.012   -0.006   -0.005   
    (1.476)   (0.494)   (-0.205)   (-0.141)  
  BOND10YR -0.064   -0.134   -0.264   -0.261   
    (-0.228)   (-0.486)   (-0.818)   (-0.692)  
  CREDSPR 0.026   0.020   0.010   -0.010   
    (0.564)   (0.476)   (0.258)   (-0.180)  
  PTFSBD 0.007   -0.026   -0.160   -0.193   
    (0.011)   (-0.048)   (-0.324)   (-0.334)  
  PTFSFX 0.788   1.070   1.568   1.914   
    (1.156)   (2.278)   (2.915)   (2.550)  
  PTFSCOM -0.842   -0.978   -1.862   -2.277   
   (-1.081)   (-1.643)   (-2.297)   (-1.939)  
  
  N 40 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2 -0.055  0.032  0.216  0.145  
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Table A.15 
Robustness Check: Regressions on Median Return Differences between Portfolios - Detail 
 
To test for the influence of extreme observations, this table shows the significance of the differences in returns 
between the Non-Reviser and Reviser portfolios using the portfolio’s median return. The monthly return 
differences are analysed against different risk models. Panel A uses factors from the Fung-Hsieh model, such as 
a market model using S&P 500, four of the market related Fung-Hsieh factors, and then the Fung-Hsieh 7 and 8 
Factor model. Panel B uses an alternate specification with the Fama-French 3 factor model, and then adds a 
momentum factor, and finally the Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity factor. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors (with three lags) are used. Regression betas are shown with t-statistics 
shown in brackets beneath. Alpha significance is denoted by stars at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Return differences (Fung-Hsieh Model) 
  Factors Constant Market FH 4 FH 7 FH 8 
  Constant 0.245*** 0.253*** 0.255*** 0.274*** 0.268*** 
   (2.397) (4.225) (3.566) (3.473) (3.405) 
  SP500 - -0.042 -0.034 -0.026 -0.005 
   - (-2.822) (-2.217) (-1.829) (-0.310) 
  SMB - - 0.003 0.008 0.008 
   - - (0.169) (0.359) (0.375) 
  BOND10YR - - -0.395 -0.280 -0.256 
   - - (-1.724) (-1.000) (-0.963) 
  CREDSPR - - -0.038 -0.039 -0.020 
   - - (-1.155) (-0.994) (-0.461) 
  PTFSBD - - - 0.501 0.451 
   - - - (0.895) (0.824) 
  PTFSFX - - - 0.425 0.435 
   - - - (0.936) (0.835) 
  PTFSCOM - - - -0.140 -0.232 
   - - - (-0.254) (-0.415) 
  EMERGING - - - - -0.020 
   - - - - (-2.186) 
       
  N 40 40 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2  0.299 0.330 0.344 0.365 
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Panel B: Return differences (Fama-French 3 factors + Momentum +  
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Model) 
  Factors FF3 FF3 + Mom 
FF3 + Mom 
+ Liquidity 
  Constant  0.260***   0.247***   0.264***  
   (3.884)   (4.071)   (5.040)  
  MKTRF -5.628   -6.145   -5.375   
   (-3.447)   (-3.796)   (-4.274)  
  SMB 0.325   0.577   1.552   
    (0.214)   (0.365)   (1.213)  
  HML 5.347   4.342   0.275   
    (2.827)   (2.230)   (0.152)  
  UMD -  -1.390   -1.176   
    -   (-2.675)   (-2.587)  
  PSLIQ -  -  -3.246   
   -   -   (-2.733)  
        
  N 40   40   40   
  Adjusted R2 0.116   0.110   0.091   
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Other robustness checks 
 
Funds-of funds 
    The returns reported by funds of hedge funds (FOFs) are of course a function of the returns earned 
by the individual hedge funds in which the FOF is invested. If an individual fund revises past returns 
then, unless it is offset by a revision in the opposite direction by another hedge fund, the FOF will have 
to revise its past returns. This leads to worries of double counting, and to whether our results are robust 
to the removal of FOFs from the analysis. 
    Tables A.15 and A.16 below replicate the results presented in the tables in the paper. The first two 
tables refer to the results from probit regressions on the types of funds that revise their returns, and are 
largely unchanged following the exclusion of FOFs. The latter table presents results on the future 
performance differential between revisers and non-revisers. We find that the risk-adjusted average 
return on the difference portfolio is slightly lower when FOFs are excluded (0.24% per month 
compared with 0.28%), but it remains strongly significant across all risk adjustment models. Thus 
revising returns remains a significant predictor of poor future performance for both individual funds 
and funds of hedge funds. 
 
Empirical results for single databases 
    In addition to tracking vintages of hedge fund databases over the period July 2007 to May 2011, this 
project also involves the consolidation of the four largest hedge fund databases (TASS, HFR, 
BarclayHedge and CISDM). Part of this consolidation process, described in detail in Appendix A of 
this document, involves the identification of funds that appear in more than one database. To avoid 
labeling as a "revision" a return that differs across two databases, we associate each fund with a single 
database (choosing the database with the longest history for that fund, if more than one database is 
available). Nevertheless, to address any concerns that the revisions we detect are due to the 
computationally-intensive tasks associated with merging and tracking vintages of multiple hedge fund 
databases, we also present results separately using just a single database at a time. 
    Table A.18 replicates the probit model results presented in the paper. We see from these tables that 
the parameter estimates and significance levels are consistent across all databases except CISDM, 
where the estimates are smaller and rarely significant. This is likely due to the fact that the CISDM 
database is updated less frequently than the other three databases. 
    In Table A.19 we present results on the reviser/non-reviser performance differential, described in the 
paper, separately for each database, using the Fung-Hsieh seven-factor model to risk adjust the returns. 
For the CISDM database we have too few updates in the out-of-sample period to include it separately 
in this analysis. The results for the other three databases are in line with the main results: the reviser 
portfolio underperforms the non-reviser portfolio. The degree of under-performance is weakest in the 
TASS database (0.14% per month) and greatest in the BarclayHedge database (0.65%) per month. For 
the HFR and BarclayHedge databases the difference is statistically significant, while not so for the 
TASS database. Thus our results are not driven by our use of a consolidated hedge fund database. 
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Table A.16 
Robustness Check (excl. FOFs): Probit Regression for Revisions 
 
The table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression on the sample but excluding Funds-of-Funds 
(FOFs). (We remove funds marked with this strategy.) The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a fund had 
revised data over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are lifetime 
average returns, lifetime average AUM, standard deviation of returns, and the autocorrelation of returns, all 
measured as ranks relative to the other funds in the data; and the number of return observations in the return 
history of the fund. Other relevant fund variables are a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the fund is 
located Offshore, a total restrictions variable (measured as the sum of the reported lockup and redemption notice 
periods), a flag which takes the value of 1 for the fund if there is any information pertaining to audits available in 
any of the databases (and in any of the vintages), and a management change flag which takes the value of 1 if the 
management company or manager name changes across vintages. We also include database and strategy fixed-
effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete change in any 
independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent variables. 
Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by database. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) 0.119*** (4.144) 
Lifetime Avg. Ret (Rank) -0.022 (-0.697) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.138*** (7.560) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.047 (1.634) 
Return History Length 0.019*** (3.874) 
Offshore -0.036 (-0.952) 
Total Restrictions 0.011*** (20.943) 
Audit 0.042* (1.779) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.112*** (3.316) 
Any Management Change 0.128*** (3.770) 
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR 0.019 (0.708) 
CISDM -0.124*** (-10.960) 
BarclayHedge -0.084*** (-9.928) 
Strategy Fixed Effects   
Macro 0.024 (1.450) 
Relative Value 0.051 (1.328) 
Directional Traders -0.044 (-0.929) 
Multi-Process -0.008 (-0.467) 
Emerging 0.030 (1.337) 
Fixed Income 0.040*** (3.711) 
Other 0.079 (1.247) 
Managed Futures 0.126*** (3.141) 
    
N 8,306    
Pseudo R2 0.067   
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Table A.17 
Robustness Check (excl. FOFs): Probit Regression for Revisions at Vintage Level 
 
This table runs essentially the same specification as in Table A.15, excluding Funds-of-Funds (FOFs), the 
difference is that we employ the panel structure of the data, and the fund-vintage is now our unit of analysis. The 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a fund revised data between the last available vintage v-1 and the 
current vintage v. The ranks of the lifetime variables are therefore now measured using data in vintage v-1 on 
assets under management, and returns. We also add an independent variable that takes the value of 1 if the fund 
experienced a data revision in the prior vintage, and 0 otherwise. Other relevant fund variables are a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the fund is located offshore, a total restrictions variable (measured as the 
sum of the reported lockup and redemption notice periods) and a flag which takes the value of 1 for the fund if 
there is any information pertaining to audits available in any of the databases. We also include database and 
strategy fixed-effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete 
change in any independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent 
variables. Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by vintage. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) (v-1) 0.029*** (7.179) 
Lifetime Avg. Return (Rank) (v-1) 0.011*** (4.321) 
Prior Year Avg. Return (Rank) (v-1) 0.024*** (5.997) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) (v-1) 0.007** (2.254) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) (v-1) 0.009*** (3.965) 
Return History Length (v-1) 0.000** (2.125) 
Prior Vintage Revision Indicator 0.215*** (11.819) 
Offshore -0.008*** (-4.775) 
Total Restrictions 0.001*** (2.831) 
Audit 0.017*** (5.058) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.007** (2.285) 
Any Management Change 0.077*** (3.775) 
Database Fixed Effects     
HFR 0.009*** (3.097) 
CISDM -0.044*** (-6.010) 
BarclayHedge 0.017** (2.054) 
Strategy Fixed Effects     
Macro 0.018*** (5.557) 
Relative Value 0.007* (1.737) 
Directional Traders -0.005** (-2.552) 
Multi-Process 0.011*** (3.445) 
Emerging 0.007** (2.209) 
Fixed Income 0.011*** (3.343) 
Other 0.016*** (3.718) 
Managed Futures 0.031*** (5.571) 
    
N 224,426    
Pseudo R2 0.133   
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Table A.18 
Robustness Check (excl. FOFs): Regressions on Return Differences between Portfolios 
 
This table shows the significance of the differences in returns between the non-reviser and reviser portfolios (on 
the sample excluding Funds-of-Funds). The monthly return differences are analysed against different risk 
models. Panel A uses factors from the Fung-Hsieh model, such as a market model using S&P 500, four of the 
market related Fung-Hsieh factors, and then the Fung-Hsieh 7 and 8 Factor model. Panel B uses an alternate 
specification with the Fama-French 3 factor model, and then adds a momentum factor, and finally the Pastor-
Stambaugh Liquidity factor. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (with 
three lags) are used. Regression betas are shown with t-statistics shown in brackets beneath. Alpha significance 
is denoted by stars at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) respectively. 
 
Panel A: Return differences (Fung-Hsieh Model) 
  Factors Constant Market FH 4 FH 7 FH 8 
  Constant 0.284*** 0.285*** 0.253*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 
    (3.536)   (4.339)   (3.141)   (2.853)   (2.886)  
  SP500 -  -0.004   -0.014   -0.016   -0.023   
    -   (-0.378)  (-0.813)  (-1.154)   (-1.799) 
  SMB -  -  0.030   0.031   0.031   
    -   -   (1.898)   (2.131)   (2.031)  
  BOND10YR -  -  -0.040   0.101   0.093   
    -   -   (-0.233)  (0.391)   (0.368)  
  CREDSPR -  -  0.023   0.045   0.039   
    -   -   (0.997)   (1.248)   (1.030)  
  PTFSBD -  -  -  -0.419   -0.402   
    -   -   -   (-0.646)   (-0.611) 
  PTFSFX -  -  -  1.152   1.149   
    -   -   -   (1.600)   (1.653)  
  PTFSCOM -  -  -  -1.353   -1.319   
    -   -   -   (-1.621)   (-1.673) 
  EMERGING -  -  -  -  0.007   
    -   -   -   -   (0.775)  
            
  N 40 40 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2   -2.27% -6.11% -4.09% -6.84% 
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Panel B: Return differences (Fama-French 3 factors + Momentum +  
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Model) 
  Factors FF3 FF3 + Mom 
FF3 + Mom 
+ Liquidity 
  Constant 0.267*** 0.245*** 0.257*** 
   (3.391)   (4.165)   (4.308)  
  MKTRF -1.455   -2.339   -1.801   
   (-1.100)   (-2.480)   (-1.644)  
  SMB 2.952   3.382   4.063   
    (1.927)   (2.059)   (2.868)  
  HML 2.204   0.486   -2.357   
    (1.616)   (0.429)   (-1.051)  
  UMD -  -2.378   -2.228   
    -   (-2.637)   (-2.576)  
  PSLIQ -  -  -2.269   
   -   -   (-1.892)  
        
  N 40 40 40 
  Adjusted R2 18.62% 16.55% 15.91% 
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Table A.19 
Robustness Check (Single Database Check): Probit Regression for Revisions 
The table shows the marginal effects from a probit regression on the sample focusing on each database in turn. 
(We drop other funds not from the database in each case). The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a fund 
had revised data over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 otherwise. The remaining regressors have 
been described earlier in these tables such as Table A.5. We also include strategy fixed-effects in the regressions. 
dF/dx shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete change in any independent dummy variable 
from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent variables. Robust standard errors control for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
TASS HFR CISDM 
Barclay 
Hedge 
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) 0.129*** 0.228*** -0.000 0.078** 
Lifetime Avg. Ret (Rank) -0.169*** 0.058 -0.077 0.001 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.138*** 0.091** 0.099 0.063* 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.092*** 0.040 0.193*** 0.078** 
Return History Length 0.028*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 
Offshore 0.018 -0.117*** -0.049 -0.033* 
Total Restrictions 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 
Audit 0.026 -0.058 0.088** -0.057 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.209*** 0.006 0.028 0.117*** 
Any Management Change 0.106*** 0.187*** 0.003 0.079*** 
     
Strategy Fixed Effects     
Macro 0.020 0.009 0.153 0.038 
Relative Value 0.292*** -0.014 0.118 0.003 
Directional Traders 0.137 -0.107** -0.081 0.023 
Funds-of-Funds 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.236*** 0.170*** 
Multi-Process -0.009 -0.011 0.093 -0.013 
Emerging 0.073*   0.080 0.003 
Fixed Income 0.023 -0.022 0.089 0.024 
Other 0.127**   0.015 -0.139 
Managed Futures 0.196*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.044 
     
N 4,585 2,983 1,106 3,454 
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.089 0.091 0.043 
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Table A.20 
Robustness Check (Single Database Check): Probit Regression for Revisions at Vintage Level 
This table runs essentially the same specification as in Table A.17, the difference is that we employ the panel 
structure of the data, and the fund-vintage is now our unit of analysis. We also focus on each database in turn. 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a fund revised data between the last available vintage v-1 and the 
current vintage v. The remaining regressors have been described earlier in tables such as Table III. We also 
include strategy fixed-effects. dF/dx shows the change in the independent variable for a discrete change in any 
independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for continuous independent variables. 
Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster by vintage. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
TASS HFR CISDM 
Barclay 
Hedge 
dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank)(v-1) 0.026*** 0.057*** 0.001 0.039*** 
Lifetime Avg. Ret (Rank) (v-1) 0.004 0.016** -0.007 0.014** 
Prior Year Avg. Return (Rank) (v-1) 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.006 0.059*** 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) (v-1) 0.005 0.009 0.005 -0.009** 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) (v-1) 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.003 0.016*** 
Return History Length(v-1) 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001 -0.002*** 
Prior Vintage Revision Indicator 0.229*** 0.243*** -0.009 0.372*** 
Offshore -0.005 -0.019*** -0.002 0.002 
Total Restrictions 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.005*** 
Audit 0.036*** 0.015*** 0.004 -0.002 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.007 0.015*** 0.001 0.023*** 
 0.099*** 0.204*** 0.164*** 0.037** 
Strategy Fixed Effects            
Macro 0.009 0.020*** 0.007 0.039*** 
Relative Value 0.040* 0.019** -0.000 -0.031*** 
Directional Traders 0.023 -0.016*** -0.005 -0.010** 
Funds-of-Funds 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.012 0.075*** 
Multi-Process 0.014** 0.006 0.005 0.003 
Emerging 0.020***   0.004 -0.012*** 
Fixed Income 0.018*** 0.002 0.009 -0.008 
Other 0.035***   -0.004 -0.074*** 
Managed Futures 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.009 0.028*** 
         
N 127,030 78,435 37,048 91,906 
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.154 0.041 0.209 
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Table A.21 
Robustness Check (Single Database Check): Regressions on Return Differences between 
Portfolios 
 
This table shows the significance of the differences in returns between the Non-Reviser and Reviser portfolios 
(focusing on each database in turn). CISDM is not shown due to the slower updating of the database. The 
monthly return differences are analysed against different risk models. Panel A analyses return differences against 
the Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor model. Panel B uses an alternate specification with the Fama-French 3 factor model, 
with a momentum factor, and the Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity factor. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust standard errors (with three lags) are used. Regression betas are shown with t-statistics 
shown in brackets beneath. Alpha significance is denoted by stars at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Return differences (Fung-Hsieh 7 Factor Model) 
  Database Selection 
Factors TASS HFR 
Barclay-
Hedge 
Constant  0.142   0.203**   0.645***  
 (1.273)   (2.380)   (4.751)  
SP500 -0.043   0.036   0.006   
 (-2.608)   (3.335)   (0.342)  
SMB 0.030   0.032   0.036   
 (1.326)   (2.316)   (1.216)  
BOND10YR -0.037   -0.195   -0.066   
 (-0.116)   (-0.834)   (-0.157)  
CREDSPR 0.040   0.001   -0.059   
 (0.852)   (0.022)   (-0.890)  
PTFSBD -0.052   0.077   0.148   
 (-0.071)   (0.138)   (0.184)  
PTFSFX 0.278   0.440   1.092   
 (0.291)   (0.725)   (1.274)  
PTFSCOM -1.052   -0.867   -0.141   
 (-0.985)   (-1.361)   (-0.134)  
      
N 32 32 40 
Adjusted R2 0.035  0.337  0.057  
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Panel B: Return differences (Fama-French 3 factors + Momentum +  
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Model)) 
  Database Selection 
  Factors TASS HFR 
Barclay-
Hedge 
  Constant  0.129**   0.205***   0.621***  
   (2.470)   (3.777)   (6.068)  
  MKTRF -4.528   1.994   -3.842   
   (-4.637)   (2.062)   (-1.631)  
  SMB 3.706   3.328   3.698   
    (2.225)   (2.718)   (1.593)  
  HML -2.883   -0.048   1.245   
    (-1.275)   (-0.025)   (0.337)  
  UMD -4.028   -1.889   -2.274   
    (-7.227)   (-5.717)   (-1.572)  
  PSLIQ -1.260   -2.081   -4.512   
   (-1.082)   (-2.281)   (-3.242)  
        
  N 32 32 40 
  Adjusted R2 0.155  0.081  0.271  
  
 
 
34 
Table A.22 
Robustness Check (Management Change Check): Probit Regression for Revisions 
This table runs essentially the same specification as in Table A.5, but tests the robustness of the management 
change flag. In Panel A, the management change flag is split into its two underlying components –management 
company name changes, and manager name changes. Panel B reflects the results over just the two databases that 
capture manager name information. The remaining regressors have been described earlier in these tables such as 
Table A.5. We also include strategy fixed-effects in the regressions. dF/dx shows the change in the independent 
variable for a discrete change in any independent dummy variable from 0 to 1, and the slope at the mean for 
continuous independent variables. Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Split Management Change Flag 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) 0.119*** (3.523) 
Lifetime Avg. Return (Rank) -0.051 (-0.836) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.112*** (5.369) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.083*** (4.731) 
Return History Length 0.020*** (4.292) 
  
Offshore -0.026 (-0.777) 
Total Restrictions 0.020*** (13.716) 
Audit 0.014 (0.549) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.137*** (2.976) 
Management Company Change 0.097*** (4.063) 
Manager Name Change 0.111** (2.457) 
   
Database Fixed Effects   
HFR 0.021 (1.025) 
CISDM -0.107*** (-8.418) 
BarclayHedge -0.087*** (-11.610) 
   
Strategy Fixed Effects  
Macro 0.038*** (3.040) 
Relative Value 0.056 (1.291) 
Directional Traders -0.047 (-1.028) 
Funds-of-Funds 0.165*** (17.624) 
Multi-Process -0.016* (-1.755) 
Emerging 0.032 (1.143) 
Fixed Income 0.026* (1.918) 
Other 0.070 (1.263) 
Managed Futures 0.147*** (3.275) 
N 12,128 
Pseudo R2 0.080 
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Panel B: Management Name Databases 
dF/dx Z-stat 
Lifetime Avg. AUM (Rank) 0.148** (1.992) 
Lifetime Avg. Return (Rank) 0.030 (1.032) 
Lifetime Ret. Std. (Rank) 0.079*** (6.011) 
Return Autocorrelation (Rank) 0.061*** (2.829) 
Return History Length 0.012*** (37.014) 
  
Offshore -0.075* (-1.925) 
Total Restrictions 0.017*** (13.176) 
Audit -0.021 (-0.798) 
High-Water Mark or Hurdle 0.076 (1.636) 
Management Company Change 0.081* (1.920) 
Manager Name Change 0.118** (2.367) 
   
Database Fixed Effects   
HFR 0.111*** (4.675) 
   
Strategy Fixed Effects  
Macro 0.031 (1.376) 
Relative Value 0.002 (0.165) 
Directional Traders -0.055 (-0.838) 
Funds-of-Funds 0.165*** (19.311) 
Multi-Process -0.006 (-0.737) 
Emerging -0.011 (-0.998) 
Fixed Income 0.006 (0.210) 
Other -0.199*** (-4.480) 
Managed Futures 0.042*** (21.329) 
N 6,437 
Pseudo R2 0.068 
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Table A.23 
Probit on Fraud Flags 
 
The table shows the coefficients from a probit regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a fund 
had revised data over any of the 40 vintages that we capture, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are 
functions of the various fraud flags, as in Table VIII. In model 1, this is the flag value, i.e. 1 if the fraud flag is 
triggered given the fund’s simulated percentile. In model 2, the dependent variable is the p-value assessed from 
the fraud test statistic or simulated percentile. Model 3 is a combination, with flags for data quality tests (first 4), 
and p-values for AR(1) and CAR(1). Funds require a minimum of 24 months of returns. Panel A is a selection of 
the tests, given ‘Num. Pairs’ is correlated to other data quality flags, and the Benford and Uniform distribution 
are highly correlated. Panel B uses all the fraud tests. Note the Pseudo R2 figures are unadjusted for the number 
of variables. Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Selected Tests 
1: Flags 2: p-values 3: Combination 
Flag Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
Constant -0.627*** (-30.739) 2.000 (-5.438) 3.000 (-16.935) 
Perc. Negative 0.045 (1.501) 0.124** (2.395) 0.038 (1.289) 
Count Zeros 0.077** (2.099) -0.361** (-2.550) 0.076** (2.073) 
String -0.011 (-0.219) 0.260 (1.370) -0.006 (-0.115) 
Perc. Repeats 0.093** (2.572) 0.348*** (6.492) 0.090** (2.493) 
AR(1) 0.077*** (2.808) 0.199*** (4.358) 0.215*** (4.733) 
CAR(1) -0.090** (-2.260) -0.119*** (-2.710) -0.119*** (-2.726) 
              
N 10,437   10,437   10,437   
Pseudo R2 0.003   0.008   0.004   
              
Panel B: All Tests 
1: Flags 2: p-values 3: Combination 
Flag Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat Coeff Z-stat 
Constant -0.628*** (-30.141) -0.448*** (-11.981) -0.592*** (-15.658) 
Perc. Negative 0.043 (1.407) -0.127** (-2.418) 0.039 (1.304) 
Count Zeros 0.074** (2.000) 0.122 (0.782) 0.076** (2.053) 
String -0.021 (-0.407) -0.322* (-1.710) -0.012 (-0.240) 
Num. Pairs 0.032 (0.424) 0.979*** (3.618) 0.035 (0.469) 
Perc. Repeats 0.089** (2.431) -0.353*** (-6.564) 0.087** (2.377) 
Uniform 0.077 (1.465) 0.024 (0.258) 0.025 (0.262) 
Benford -0.066 (-1.165) -0.036 (-0.381) -0.045 (-0.476) 
AR(1) 0.077*** (2.826) -0.200*** (-4.368) -0.215*** (-4.733) 
CAR(1) -0.090** (-2.241) 0.119*** (2.714) 0.119*** (2.710) 
              
N 10,437   10,437   10,437   
Pseudo R2 0.003   0.009   0.004   
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Table A.24 
Robustness Check (Excluding CISDM): Liquidation Probabilities 
 
This table shows the liquidation probabilities of the combined reviser and non-reviser funds, and then excludes  
the funds from CISDM due to its infrequent reporting. Funds reporting returns are classified within a period, and 
this cohort is tracked over future six monthly horizons until they stop reporting returns. Liquidation probabilities 
are calculated relative to the initial number of funds in the cohort. For example, in the six month period up to 
December 2008, a combined 7,533 funds report returns. Going forward 12 months later, 26.5% of these funds 
had ceased reporting. Excluding CISDM funds leaves only 6,771 funds reporting returns over this period, with 
lower liquidation rates after a year of 18.3%. Liquidation rates are averaged across horizons. 
 
              
  Liquidation Probabilities: Months ahead 
Classification Period  Fund Count 6 12 18 24 30 
All Funds             
  Up to Jun 2008 8,875  0.140 0.309 0.375 0.431  0.519 
  Up to Dec 2008 7,533  0.192 0.265 0.329 0.434    
  Up to Jun 2009 6,440  0.085 0.161 0.290     
  Up to Dec 2009 6,184  0.078 0.219       
  Up to Jun 2010 5,525  0.146         
  Up to Dec 2010 4,562            
  Average   0.128 0.239 0.331 0.432  0.519 
              
All Funds (Excluding CISDM)           
  Up to Jun 2008 7,941  0.134 0.228 0.302 0.364  0.463 
  Up to Dec 2008 6,771  0.101 0.183 0.254 0.370    
  Up to Jun 2009 6,440  0.085 0.161 0.290     
  Up to Dec 2009 6,184  0.078 0.219       
  Up to Jun 2010 5,525  0.146         
  Up to Dec 2010 4,562            
  Average   0.109 0.198 0.282 0.367  0.463 
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Table A.25 
Robustness Check: Correlated Revisions Across Shareclasses and Databases 
 
This table shows the extent to which revisions are correlated across databases and shareclasses. 300 funds were 
sampled at random from our universe of funds. For example, in the third column, for 184 of these revising funds, 
a duplicate fund could be found in another database. Of these matched funds, 68.5% had at least one other 
related fund with a revision in the same period in another database. 
 
  Shareclasses  Databases 
(1) Funds with shareclasses or reporting to multiple databases 219 184 
(2) Total revisions for funds in (1) 3,173 2,565 
      
       (3) Average number of entities per funds in (1) 5.526 2.489 
       (4) Average number of entities reporting at time of revision 2.190 1.365 
      
       (5) Funds in (1) with another entity in (4) revising  156 126 
       (6) Percentage of funds with correlated revision (5)/(1) 0.712 0.685 
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Table A.26 
Investor Flows and Revisions 
 
The table shows from a regression of flows on past performance for revising funds.  The dependent variable is 
the flow in the following calendar year t+1, for all years t for which a fund revised returns (recall notation 
R(i,t,v) for a fund i in a period t reported in a vintage v).  The dependent variables are the “initial” return reported 
by the fund for year t, i.e., the return R(i,t,vinitial) reported in the first vintage vinitial of data available for the 
fund, and the difference between the “final” return i.e., the return R(i,t,vfinal) reported in the final vintage vfinal 
of data available for the fund and the initial return reported by the fund for the same year t.  For example, if fund 
X initially reported 4% average annual return for year t, and at the final vintage, this reported average stood at 
6% including the impact of all revisions, then the Last-Initial variable would be 2%. Flows are standardised by 
the fund’s previous year AUM, and we only include periods in which the fund had at least 6 months of return 
observations, to reduce the noise in the dependent variable. We also include strategy fixed-effects and crisis 
period dummies in some of the specifications. Robust standard errors control for heteroskedasticity, and cluster 
at the fund-level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Future Flows  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Last Return 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.281*** 0.262*** 
Last - Initial Return   0.313* 0.313* 0.303* 
Lagged Flow - - 0.207*** 0.202*** 
          
Strategy Fixed Effects? - - Y Y 
Crisis Period Dummy? - - - Y 
          
N 5,726 5,726 5,726 5,726 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.093 0.099 0.110 
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